let em work it out

Seems cynical and callous.

Israel Backs Limited Strike Against Syria

When the uprising began, many here saw Mr. Assad, who like his predecessor and father had maintained quiet on the border, as “the devil you know,” and therefore preferable to the rebels, some of whom were aligned with Al Qaeda or Sunni militants like the Palestinian Hamas faction.  

As the death toll has mounted, more Israelis joined a camp led by Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israeli military intelligence, who argues that the devil you know is, actually, a devil who should be ousted sooner rather than later.  

That split remains. But as hopes have dimmed for the emergence of a moderate, secular rebel force that might forge democratic change and even constructive dialogue with Israel, a third approach has gained traction: Let the bad guys burn themselves out.  

“The perpetuation of the conflict is absolutely serving Israel’s interest,” said Nathan Thrall, a Jerusalem-based analyst for the International Crisis Group.  

Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, was one of several experts who said this view differs from the callous “let them all kill each other” shrug popular here during the long-running Iran-Iraq war. Rather, Ms. Wittes said, the reasoning behind a strike that would not significantly change the Syrian landscape is that the West needs more time to prop up opposition forces it finds more palatable and prepare them for future governing. 

She cited dangers for Israel if the conflict continues to drag on, including more efforts to transfer advanced weapons to Hezbollah, instability in Lebanon and pressure on Jordan.

Iraqis, Looking Across Border, See Replays of Past and Fears for the Future

As Qaeda-allied rebels took on a growing role in Syria, that case became harder to make. And while the Iraqi government has maintained in public that it is neutral on Syria, and wishes only for a political solution, the reality is that the Shiite ruling class here is rooting for an Assad victory. 

Last week, as the debate over possible military strikes on Syria intensified in Washington, Mr. Maliki met here with the American ambassador, Robert S. Beecroft, to voice his opposition.  

Afterward, in an interview, Ali al-Mousawi, Mr. Maliki’s spokesman, summarized the exchange.  

“We told him that such action, as we see it, will not help the Syrian people, and that the regime in Syria will not be affected by such a strike,” said Mr. Mousawi. “But Assad may gain more benefits, support and legitimacy. Therefore, we think that the biggest losers are going to be the people of Syria and the neighboring countries.”

Iraq: What I Got Wrong, and What I Still Believe by Jonathan Chait

The biggest single conceptual failure of my argument for war is that I gave absurdly little thought to the post-invasion phase. I was aware that the Bush administration was deploying far too few troops to the front for a workable occupation while blatantly lying about the war’s likely costs. I assumed that its real plan was to decapitate the Iraqi leadership, install a more pliant and less brutal military figure in Saddam’s place, and call it democracy. 

In other words, I deemed the administration’s rhetoric about democracy to be a pack of lies. Now, I could accept this, because I assumed the successor regime would be less brutal than the psychotically cruel one that was being deposed. The quality of the regime was an important predicate for my support of the war — I would not have supported it had I believed it would make life harder for Iraqis, on the whole — but not the necessary rationale. I assumed these things because at the time Bush appeared — from the 2000 campaign through Florida through his push to cut taxes — to be a dishonest but ruthlessly effective figure. A messy, undermanned occupation would be politically fatal, I reasoned, therefore Bush wouldn’t actually undertake one. 

But my view of the postwar was facile. I really focused nearly all my attention to the legitimacy of the war, and almost none to its advisability. Indeed, I essentially mistook one for the other: In my mind, establishing that the United States had a moral right to enforce the truce terms of the Gulf War closed the case. 

Now, why didn’t I think very hard about the occupation? I think I was probably influenced by the recent history. And here is where I depart most sharply from most other liberals, especially the younger ones, who have responded to the war by adopting dramatically more anti-interventionist views on foreign policy.

Saddam Hussein should have complied with the weapon inspectors. Instead he ended up in a spider hole and then lynched.

The Iraq Effect: If Saddam Hussein were still in power, this year's Arab uprisings could never have happened. by Hitchens

The Iraq Effect: If Saddam Hussein were still in power, this year's Arab uprisings could never have happened. by Hitchens

He who does battle with monsters needs to watch out lest he in the process becomes a monster himself. And if you stare too long into the abyss, the abyss will stare right back at you.

----- Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil

John Burns on the end of the Iraq War.

In Korea, a Model for Iraq by Paul Wolfowitz.

Ever since 9/11 and the toppling of Saddam Hussein I have really lost a lot of respect for the so-called "anti-war" left. Their arguments are almost always disingenuous and self-righteous. Very few will face up to how bad Saddam Hussein actually was. It's all about pointing fingers at America and how wrong Republicans are.

I've never had much respect for conservatives as it was, but after 9/11, Afghanistan and Iraq they really let the mask slip. Cheney, Bush, David Addington, George Tenet, John Yoo, Jay Bybee, Rumsfeld, etc. decided to "take the gloves off" and make America into a lawless torture-state, not unlike Saddam's Baathist police state. Now I have even less respect for conservatives.