IS WOLFGANG MUNCHAU CONFUSING THE SIRENS WITH CASSANDRA? by DeLong
I was surprised by:
- John Roberts's ruling on Obamacare
- the reemergence of Professor Bernanke
- the IMF's turn towards sanity
The main force pulling up growth is accommodative monetary policy. Central banks continue not only to maintain very low policy rates, but also to experiment with programs aimed at decreasing rates in particular markets, at helping particular categories of borrowers, or at helping financial intermediation in general.
The effusion of books about the 2007-08 financial crisis has mostly run its course. Two new accounts by policy-makers who were sometimes in the room (Bailout: An Inside Account of How Washington Abandoned Main Street While Rescuing Wall Street, by Neil Barofsky, who kept tabs on Treasury Department lending under the Troubled Asset Relief Program as its Special Inspector General; and Bull By the Horns: Fighting to Save Main Street from Wall Street and Wall Street from Itself
Cutting-edge journalists, meanwhile, have moved on to the battles of Barack Obama’s first term: The New New Deal: The Hidden Story of Change in the Obama Era, by Michael Grunwald, of The Washington Post, explores the logic of the stimulus; The Price of Politics, by Bob Woodward, also of the Post, recounts the failed grand bargain negotiation of the summer of 2011; and Red Ink: Inside the High-Stakes Politics of the Federal Budget, by David Wessel, of The Wall Street Journal
Much the best economics book on the fall calendar therefore (to be published next month) is a slender account about the circumstances that led to that near meltdown in September 2008, and an explanation of why they were not apparent until the last moment. Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See Them Coming (Oxford University Press), by Gary Gorton, of Yale University’s School of Management, mentions hardly any of the firms involved in the 2008 smash-up; it spends little time explaining the overnight repurchase agreements that were at the center of the bank funding crisis (his earlier book, Slapped By the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007, did that).
In August, Mr. Singh, who has frequently sought Mr. Rajan’s advice, called and asked him to take a leave from his job as a professor at the University of Chicago to return to India, where he was born, to help revive the country’s flagging economy. Within weeks, he was at work as the chief economic adviser in the Finance Ministry....
Mr. Rajan, 49, became famous in the economics profession for his prescience in warning about the growing risks in the financial system at a Federal Reserve conference in 2005, three years before the failure of Lehman Brothers. He argued that innovations and deregulation appeared to have made the global financial system riskier, rather than safer and more stable as many economists and top policy makers like Alan Greenspan then believed.
The son of an Indian diplomat, Mr. Rajan grew up around the world and in New Delhi, earning degrees from prestigious Indian universities before studying economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His first big policy job came when he was appointed the chief economist of the International Monetary Fund. Since 2008, he has been an external adviser to Mr. Singh, who is his highest-placed champion in India and who also asked him to lead a committee to propose changes to the country’s financial system.
Problem 1. People now expect near 2% inflation. Presumably they will keep expecting this until something happens to change their mind. What might happen, and how would it change their mind?
Most likely, I think: the adult population keeps growing (as it will for the next 15 years with near 100% probability) and eventually the rising demand for housing causes rising rents and home prices and a boom in construction, as well as consumption via mortgage equity withdrawal, along with the associated multiplier effects. Eventually the associated increase in aggregate demand uses up all easily available labor and starts to bid up prices. People notice that the Fed is not raising rates despite an increase in the inflation rate. As more and more people realize that the Fed is not going to raise rates, they come to expect a higher inflation rate, and you get Friedman-Phelps-Lucas effects. So the inflation rate just keeps rising. Eventually people realize that the Fed is never, ever going to raise rates, and you get hyperinflation.
Another possibility: Profit margins are very high right now, on average. Maybe firms will start competing aggressively and prices will fall. And since there's high unemployment, once they compete away those profits, maybe they will start cutting wages. So you get deflation. This raises the real interest rate and makes investment less attractive, which reduces demand, which accelerates the deflation, so you get a deflationary spiral. Note however, that this deflationary spiral would happen no matter what the Fed does with interest rates. Also note that it seems intuitively kind of implausible that we could have a bubble in the value of money that never pops. So if I had to choose, I think that my first possibility is much more likely -- at least it's more likely to be the eventual endgame, although you could get some temporary deflation along the way.
Problem 2. Given the Fed's current asset base, the only way it could keep the interest rate at 50% is by paying 50% interest on reserves. That would effectively suck nearly all the money out of the economy, because banks would stop lending and start bidding aggressively for deposits. But it would all be funny money, because the Fed's net worth would go ever deeper into negative territory. (It's assets are mostly longer duration assets that would lose most of their value if the 50% interest rates were expected to persist.) It's hard to say what the endgame would be. Maybe extreme deflation and increasing use of alternative means of payment. Or maybe not, maybe people would lose confidence in money -- these credits the Fed would be making without anything to back them up -- and we would get inflation instead.
...Customers, unable to make much money on the stock market, would invest in homes instead. "The consumer," Longbrake told the group, "has found that small increases in housing prices, given the substantial leverage that is much greater than ever was possible in the stock market, can lead to large gains in home equity." At the same time, refinancing a mortgage would become easier for the customer, as would taking out a home equity line of credit.
"The bubble then build through a reinforcing cycle of rising home prices and rising consumer confidence. This leads to an increase in the demand for investor properties and second homes, which, in turn, places further upward pressure on home prices."Second homes?
Via The Irish Economy, a new paper (pdf) from the IMF looks at how, exactly, massive current imbalances emerged within Europe, with Germany running huge surpluses and the GIPSIs running huge deficits.
The paper shows that there were indeed huge capital flows from the European core to the periphery, in Spain largely taking the form of lending to banks, presumably by other banks:Emphasis added. So basically the U.S. dollar is undervalued relative to China which has a trade surplus. Germany in turn has a trade surplus with Asia (right?). Southern Europe increased its imports from low-wage countries (China?).
[chart]
The surprising result in the paper is that much of the rise in imbalances within the euro area involved trade with non-euro nations. Germany sharply increased exports to Asia and Eastern Europe, which had strong demand for German durable manufactures. Meanwhile, southern Europe saw a sharp increase in imports from low-wage countries.