Saturday, August 29, 2015

Stannis is alive in the books.

via Salon:
While we never exactly saw Stannis Baratheon die on the show, we did see him get a sword to the head courtesy of Brienne of Tarth before the camera cut away, making it seem pretty clear that the disgraced Lord of Dragonstone was well on his way to a rendezvous with the Many Faced God. As episode director David Nutter said at Comic-Con, “From the beginning, and [through] the script process, that was the intent — he’s dead.”
But according to George R. R Martin, Stannis is alive and well — at least in the books. At the end of “A Dance With Dragons”, Ramsay Bolton sends a letter to Jon Snow saying he has killed Stannis, even though we never witness the actual death take place. But addressing a fan on his LiveJournal who asked whether Stannis was alive or dead, Martin responded definitively: “In my books? Alive beyond a doubt.”
Of course, the books and the show often diverge (remember the whole Lady Stoneheart debacle?) so it’s possible that Stannis is alive in the books and dead in the show. Or it is possible that Stannis somehow survived Brienne’s sword and he has a part to play in the great (onscreen) battle of ice and fire to come. But most importantly, it leaves open the option that Book-Stannis could be redeemed as a character — which would be a nice consolation prize for the fans still reeling from TV-Stannis’ arc at the end of last season.

Friday, August 28, 2015

Chris Giles is the worst, or how to be a bootlicker for the rich and powerful special interests

I'll never subscribe to the FT.

How to be hard left without being stupid by Chris Giles
There is no left-right dividing line in sensible economic policymaking. Everyone needs to define their ambitions, understand how policy might achieve goals and recognise constraints. Mr Corbyn’s ambition is clear: he wants a more equal and a more prosperous society
Since this desire is shared across the political spectrum, the radical left must demonstrate its ability to act where other, more conservative forces, are constrained.
Not true. There is a left-right divide and that desire is not shared. They may say that, but their actions belie what they say.
All of this is economically literate, radical and left wing. Little of this is Corbynomics. For him, there are vast untapped pools of free money, to be accessed via setting up a national investment bank, attacking so-called “corporate welfare”, engaging in quantitative easing “for the people” or simply ending austerity.
Again, not true. This is the guy who attacked Piketty in a vague fashion.



Wednesday, August 26, 2015

Lisa Belkin on the Yonkers Housing Crisis

The Painful Lessons of the Yonkers Housing Crisis by Lisa Belkin
Crime has not increased. Property values have not decreased. Life is pretty much the same for those who lived on these blocks before the townhouses were built. And for those who moved in from the projects? The change of address didn’t solve all their problems, but it did make their lives safer, cleaner and measurably better.

Last month, the Obama administration announced that it would put teeth behind a policy making federal housing funds conditional on a city’s demonstrated efforts to reduce housing segregation. It won’t be easy. 
Already in Westchester County, not far north of Yonkers, local politicians are sounding exactly like those here in the 1980s. Ordered to build 750 units of affordable housing in 31 of its wealthiest, whitest towns, Westchester’s county executive, Rob Astorino, staged a photo op at Hillary Clinton’s front gate in Chappaqua, warning: “This is happening right here in Westchester County, and if you live in Ohio, if you live in Florida, if you live in Maine — wherever you live in the United States — you are next.” 
But if there is a new commitment from the federal government, and the longstanding but deeply frayed rules are actually (and finally) enforced, then perhaps the legacy of Yonkers can be more than Pyrrhic. Maybe we’re a few steps further along than we thought.

Tuesday, August 25, 2015

The Men in Blazers with David Simon

The Men in Blazers Show: David Simon Interview

I've been getting into Premier League Football/Soccer via NBCSN and USA. These guys had a funny interview with David Simon who was promoting Show Me A Hero.


Sunday, August 23, 2015

safe assets and the natural rate

My Quiz for Wannabe Keynesians by Roger Farmer

A Tale of Two Natural Rates by Roger Farmer

Farmer disagrees with Krugman who agrees with Williamson.

The Natural Rate Hypothesis: an ideapast its sell-by date by Roger Farmer

Why financial markets are inefficient by Roger Farmer


Wow Farmer predicts a Great Depression. A little alarmist.

Saturday, August 22, 2015

German wage repression

German Wage Repression: Getting to the Roots of the Eurozone Crisis By John Miller

Germany has been insistent that the so-called peripheral countries increase their competitiveness through slower wages rises or even wage cuts. Wage increases in Germany are an equally important, and symmetrical, part of this necessary adjustment process.
The wage increases are steps in the right direction, but relatively small steps. More gains for German workers in the future would be both warranted and a win-win proposition for Germany and its trade partners.
— Ben Bernanke, “German wage hikes: A small step in the right direction,” Brookings Institution, April 13, 2015.
Ben Bernanke not only supports recent German wage increases, he also thinks further wage increases for German workers are “warranted and a win-win proposition for Germany and its trade partners”?
Now that’s a jaw-dropper. Has the former head of the Federal Reserve Board—the guardian of “price stability,” which makes policy designed to keep U.S. wages in check—switched sides in the class war, now that he is retired?
Hardly. Rather, it’s that catering to the demands of German high finance and other elites has been so disastrous that even the former chair of the Fed cannot deny the undeniable: unless Germany changes course and boosts workers’ wages, the euro crisis will only worsen.
Let’s look more closely at just how German wage repression and currency manipulation pushed the eurozone into crisis, ignited a conflict between northern and southern eurozone countries (with Germany as the enforcer of austerity), and left Greece teetering on the edge of collapse.
From “Sick Man” to Export Bully
In 2000, Germany was widely considered “the sick man of Europe.” Through much of the previous decade, the German economy had grown more slowly than the European Union average, its manufacturing base had shrunk, and its unemployment rate had risen to near double-digit levels. Nor was Germany an export powerhouse, with its current account (the mostly widely used and most comprehensive measure of a nation’s financial balance with the rest of the world) showing a modest deficit in 2000.
Adopting the euro as its sole currency, in January 2002, was no panacea. For the next two years, Germany’s economy continued to stagnate. But converting to the euro—whose value was more or less an average of that of the stronger and weaker former currencies of the member countries—soon did improve Germany’s competitive position internationally. German exports, no longer valued in strong deutschmarks, but in weaker euros, became cheaper to buyers in other countries. At the same time, the exports of countries that used to have weaker currencies, such as the Greek drachma and the Spanish peseta, became more expensive. That alone transformed Germany’s current account deficit into a surplus.
China is widely accused of “currency manipulation,” keeping the renminbi weak to boost its exports. But few see that the eurozone—the now 19- country bloc sharing the euro as its common currency—has functioned for Germany as a built-in currency manipulation system. And much like China, Germany used a lethal combination of wage repression and an undervalued currency to boost its exports and output at the expense of its trading partners.
Following the adoption of the euro, Germany instituted a set of “labormarket flexibility” policies intended to further improve its international competitiveness. Known as the “Agenda 2010 Reforms,” the new policies reduced pensions, cut medical benefits, and slashed the duration of unemployment benefits from nearly three years to just one. They made it easier to fire workers, while encouraging the creation of parttime and short-term jobs. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reports that, from the mid-1990s to 2008, the incomes of the poorest 30% of Germans actually declined in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. Germany’s repressive labor policies kept a lid on wage growth. In every year from 2000 through the onset of the financial crisis in 2009, German compensation per employee increased more slowly than the eurozone average, and less even than in the United States.
During the 1990s, German workers’ real (inflation-adjusted) wages rose along with productivity gains, meaning that employers could pay the higher wages without facing higher labor costs per unit of output. After 1999, wage gains no longer kept pace with productivity, and the gap between the two widened. As wages stagnated, inequality worsened, and poverty rates rose. Total labor compensation (wages and benefits) fell from 61% of GDP in 2001 to just 55% of GDP in 2007, its lowest level in five decades.
German wage repression went even further than necessary to meet the 2% inflation target mandated by the eurozone agreement, and insisted upon by German policymakers. Unit labor cost (workers’ compensation per unit of output) is perhaps the most important determinant of prices and competitiveness. Unit labor cost rises with wage increases but falls with gains in productivity. From 1999 to 2013, German unit labor cost increased by just 0.4% a year. The reason was not German productivity growth, which was no greater than the eurozone average over the period; rather, it was that German labor-market policies kept wage growth in check.
This combination of a built-in system of currency manipulation afforded by the euro and labor-market policies holding labor costs in check turned Germany into the world’s preeminent trade-surplus country. As its competitive advantage grew, its exports soared. Germany’s current account surplus became the largest in the world relative to the size of its economy, reaching 7.6% of the country’s GDP, more than twice the size of China’s surplus compared to its GDP.
Beggar Thy Neighborhood
Germany’s transformation into an export powerhouse came at the expense of the southern eurozone economies. Despite posting productivity gains that were equal or almost equal to Germany’s, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy saw their labor costs per unit of output—and in turn prices rise— considerably faster than Germany’s. Wage growth in these countries exceeded productivity growth, and the resulting higher unit labor costs pushed prices up by more than the eurozone’s low 2% annual inflation target (though by only a small margin).
The widening gap in unit labor costs gave Germany a tremendous competitive advantage and left the southern eurozone economies at a tremendous disadvantage. Germany amassed its ever-larger current account surplus, while the southern eurozone economies were saddled with worsening deficits. Later in the decade, the Greek, Portuguese, and Spanish current account deficits approached or even reached alarming double-digit levels, relative to the sizes of their economies.
In this way, German wage repression is an essential component of the euro crisis. Heiner Flassbeck, the German economist and longtime critic of wage repression, and Costas Lapavistas, the Greek economist best known for his work on financialization, put it best in their recent book Against the Troika: Crisis and Austerity in the Eurozone: “Germany has operated a policy of ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ but only after ‘beggaring its own people’ by essentially freezing wages. This is the secret of German success during the last fifteen years.”
While Germany’s huge exports across Europe and elsewhere created German jobs and lowered the country’s unemployment rate, the German economy never grew robustly. Wage repression subsidized exports, but it sapped domestic spending. And, held back by this chronic lack of domestic demand, Germany’s economic growth was far from impressive, before or after the Great Recession. From 2002 to 2008, the German economy grew more slowly than the eurozone average, and over the last five years has failed to match even the sluggish growth rates posted by the U.S. economic recovery. With low wage growth, consumption stagnated. German corporations hoarded their profits and private investment relative to GDP fell almost continuously from 2000 on. The same was true for German public investment, held back by the eurozone budgetary constraints.
At the same time, Germany spread instability. Germany’s reliance on foreign demand for its exports drained spending from elsewhere in the eurozone and slowed growth in those countries. That, in turn, made it less likely that German banks and elites would recover their loans and investments in southern Europe.
Wage Repression and the Crisis
No wonder Bernanke now describes higher German wages as an important step toward reducing Europe’s trade imbalances. More spending by German workers on domestic goods and imports would help Germany and its trading partners grow, and improve the lot of working people throughout the eurozone.
Of course, much more needs to be done. Putting an end to the austerity measures imposed on Greece and the other struggling eurozone economies would boost their demand as well. In fact, it would also better serve the interests of Germany and the profit-making class, by helping to stabilize a system from which they have benefited so greatly at the expense of much of the region’s population.
Still, raising the wages of German workers to match productivity gains is, as Bernanke recognizes, surely a step in the right direction. Raising U.S. wages to match productivity gains would help defuse U.S. wage repression and boost economic growth here as well. If Bernanke throws his weight behind that proposition, we’ll truly wonder which side is he on.
Sources:  Kaja Bonesmo Fredrikson, “Income Inequality in the European Union,” OECD Economic Department Working Papers, No. 952, April 16, 2012; Brian Blackstone, “Germany’s Rising Wages Bode Well for Global Economy,” Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2015; Heiner Flassbeck and Costas Lapavistas, Against the Troika: Crisis and Austerity in the Eurozone(Verso, 2015); Real News Network, Interview with Heiner Flassbeck: “Germany’s Collective Denial,”  Feb. 22, 2015; Ben Bernanke, “Greece and Europe: Is Europe Holding up its end of the Bargain?” Ben Bernanke’s Blog, July 17, 2015; Philippe Legrain, “Germany’s Economic Mirage,” Project Syndicate, Sept. 23, 2014.
John Miller is a professor of economics at Wheaton College and a member of the Dollars & Sense collective.

Tuesday, August 18, 2015

Corbynomics and a QE for the people

CORBYNOMICS - MEH by Chris Dillow

Economist defends 'Corbynomics' after Chris Leslie's criticism

People's QE and Corbyn’s QE by Simon Wren-Lewis

Now the Bank of England needs to deliver QE for the people by Mark Blyth, Eric Lonergan and Simon Wren-Lewis

The Constant Reserves Multiplier by Eric Lonergan

On Corbynomics by Chris Dillow

Invest in Our Future by Jeremy Corbyn



The Bank, helicopter money and fiscal conservatism by Simon Wren-Lewis

Print Less but Transfer More: Why Central Banks Should Give Money Directly to the People by Mark Blyth and Eric Lonergan




Varoufakis

 The Greek Warrior by Ian Parker
It was as if Christopher Hitchens had woken up one day as Secretary of State. Varoufakis was no longer writing elegantly prosecutorial blog posts about Christine Lagarde, the managing director of the I.M.F.; he was meeting with Lagarde. Within days of Greece’s election, an academic with Marxist roots, a shaved head, and a strong jaw had become one of the world’s most recognizable politicians. He showed a level of intellectual and rhetorical confidence—or, perhaps, unearned swagger—that lifted Greek hearts and infuriated Northern European politicians. His reluctance to wear a tie seemed to convey the impossibility of containing his manliness.

Saturday, August 15, 2015

the enemy

Was it possible, that at every gathering--concert, peace rally, love-in, be-in, and freak-in, here, up north, back east, wherever--those dark crews had been busy all along, reclaiming the music, the resistance to power, the sexual desire from epic to everyday, all they could sweep up, for the ancient forces of greed and fear?
Pynchon, Inherent Vice 

Tuesday, August 11, 2015

Krugman on competitiveness and class warfare

What about trade balances and export sectors?

Competitiveness and Class Warfare by Krugman

For reasons not entirely clear to me, recently I found myself thinking about Lester Thurow’s Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America. For those too young, or who don’t remember, Thurow’s book was a monster best-seller in the early 1990s; it resonated with many people who feared that America was losing its economic edge, that Japan was an unstoppable juggernaut, and so on. And it also played into the general notion of global economics as a struggle for competitive advantage, which is a perennial popular favorite.
I was pretty critical of that notion at the time, arguing that economic success or failure had little to do with international competition. But what I found myself thinking about was the question of who really did best in the decades that followed Thurow’s book. And the answer is … nobody.
The chart shows real GDP per working-age adult (15-64) in France, Japan, and America since 1990. The demographic correction is important: Japan has lagged economically, but a lot of that is just demography.
Photo
CreditOECD
What’s striking here is how similar the three look. Japan lagged in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but recovered. France has lagged since 2010, largely thanks to the eurozone crisis and its misguided austerity policies. But given how much rhetoric there is about structural problems here and there, what’s striking is how little divergence there has been among advanced countries.
What this tells you, I think, isn’t just that international competition is far less important than legend has it. It also suggests that economic growth is pretty insensitive to policy: France and the US are at the extremes of advanced-country regimes, yet there’s not much difference in their long-term performance.
But does this say that policy doesn’t matter? Not at all. For while there is not, repeat not, anything like the zero-sum competition among nations so beloved of business types, there really is the question of who gets the gains. U.S. economic growth has been OK these past 25 years; US family incomes, not so much, because such a large share of growth goes to the very top.
International competition is a mostly bogus notion; class warfare is very, very real.

Monday, August 03, 2015

the one percent

I have this quote up above:

"If you want to know what God thinks of money, just look at the people he gave it to."
- Dorothy Parker
See Donald Trump. Sure there are good rich people. Of course. Conservatives and the corporate media would like you to believe they are virtuous and blessed by God. But pop culture seems to be coming around. For example:

Foxcatcher. Another Period. Season Three of Ray Donovan. Hell on Wheels. HBO's The Casual Vacancy. Mr. Robot.

Humans



attacks on Corbynomics

August 03, 2015

Sunday, August 02, 2015

Krugman on Freshwater's wrong turn

Freshwater's Wrong Turn by Krugman

Paul Romer has been writing a series of posts on the problem he calls “mathiness”, in which economists write down fairly hard-to-understand mathematical models accompanied by verbal claims that don’t actually match what’s going on in the math. Most recently, he has been recounting the pushback he’s getting fromfreshwater macro types, who seem him as allying himself with evil people like me — whereas he sees them as having turned away from science toward a legalistic, adversarial form of pleading.
You can guess where I stand on this. But in his latest, he notes some of the freshwater types appealing to their glorious past, claiming that Robert Lucas in particular has a record of intellectual transparency that should insulate him from criticism now. PR replies that Lucas once was like that, but no longer, and asks what happened.
Well, I’m pretty sure I know the answer.
First of all, it’s true about the initial transparency. In the beginning, Lucas and disciples had a very clear statement of both the problem and their solution. They took it as an observed fact that fluctuations in nominal demand were associated with fluctuations in real output, as opposed to merely affecting the price level, which shouldn’t happen if prices were flexible. But they insisted that it was illegitimate to assume sticky prices and wages, that any story you tell must be grounded in microfoundations — and not just that, in maximizing behavior.
So Lucas came up with a story: it was all about imperfect information. Faced with a shock to nominal demand, producers couldn’t tell how much was just a money fluctuation and how much a real change in demand for their particular product, to which they should respond by changing output. So they would engage in signal extraction, making the best possible estimate; this would lead in aggregate to an upward-sloping aggregate supply curve, but only because of rational confusion. And this in turn had strong policy implications: you might see a relationship between money and output, but it would disappear if you tried to use it.
It was a lovely, intellectually interesting and exciting approach. It was also quite wrong.
The wrongness took a few years to become irrefutable. By the early 1980s, however, it was overwhelmingly clear that rational confusion couldn’t explain business cycles, either empirically or theoretically — business cycles last too long, rational agents should be able to tell real from nominal shocks using information like asset prices, and more. And so you had a substantial chunk of the profession going back to sticky-price models, arguing that under imperfect competition things like menu costs or slight deviations from perfect rationality were enough to make money very non-neutral in the short run.
But Lucas and his school couldn’t do that, because they had burned their bridges. They had seized the moment when people took their models seriously to loudly and aggressively declare that Keynesianism of any form was total nonsense, that everything macroeconomists had done in the previous four decades was worthless. it would have taken a lot of intellectual integrity to admit that they might have been premature, that their models weren’t working and that maybe there was something in that Keynesian stuff after all. And that kind of integrity did not manifest itself.
Instead they went even further down the equilibrium rabbit hole, notably with real business cycle theory. And here is where the kind of willful obscurantism Romer is after became the norm. I wrote last year about the remarkable failure of RBC theorists ever to offer an intuitive explanation of how their models work, which I at least hinted was willful:
But the RBC theorists never seem to go there; it’s right into calibration and statistical moments, with never a break for intuition. And because they never do the simple version, they don’t realize (or at any rate don’t admit to themselves) how fundamentally silly the whole thing sounds, how much it’s at odds with lived experience.
What Romer is telling us, based on his discussion of growth models, is that this kind of thing is pervasive in that school. And no, everyone doesn’t do it. Read Mike Woodford or Gauti Eggertsson or Ken Rogoff when he’s doing theory: they all take pains to provide an intuition behind their models, and they don’t engage in false advertising.
So what happened to freshwater, I’d argue, is that a movement that started by doing interesting work was corrupted by its early hubris; the braggadocio and trash-talking of the 1970s left its leaders unable to confront their intellectual problems, and sent them off on the path Paul now finds so troubling.

Vangelis

Vangelis composed the musical scores to Chariots of Fire, Blade Runner and Missing among other movies.



Ian McShane joins Game of Thrones cast

Ian McShane joins Game of Thrones cast

"Pain or damage don't end the world. Or despair, or fucking beatings. The world ends when you're dead. Until then, you got more punishment in store. Stand it like a man... and give some back."


Thursday, July 30, 2015

Best Coast - California Nights




Jeremy Corbyn and Chris Dillow

ON CORBYNOMICS

by Chris Dillow
Jeremy Corbyn's economic policy deserves more attention than it's getting.
It seems to me that this comprises two necessarily related elements. One is higher corporate taxes: he wants to "strip out some of the huge tax reliefs and subsidies on offer to the corporate sector" - which he claims to be £93bn a year. This would depress investment, by depriving firms of some of the means and motive to invest. However, this would be offset by "people's quantitative easing" - a money-financed fiscal expansion:
The Bank of England must be given a new mandate to upgrade our economy to invest in new large scale housing, energy, transport and digital projects.
This amounts to what Keynes called a "socialisation of investment":
It seems unlikely that the influence of banking policy on the rate of interest will be sufficient by itself to determine an optimum rate of investment. I conceive, therefore, that a somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment will prove the only means of securing an approximation to full employment; though this need not exclude all manner of compromises and of devices by which public authority will co-operate with private initiative. (General Theory, ch 24)
This is a response to a genuine problem - low capital spending. The share of business investment in GDP has (in nominal terms) been trending downwards since the mid-70s.

Sunday, July 26, 2015

AV Club reviews Rectify: "Sown with Salt"



"“I’m Forrest.” “I’m Trees,” she says without missing a beat." Reminds me of Lorrie Moore.

AV Club reviews Rectify: “Sown With Salt”


Saturday, July 25, 2015

central banks, inflation and the value of money

Neo-Fisherism and All That by David Glasner

But the problem for monetary theory is that without a real-value equivalent to assign to money, the value of money in our macroeconomic models became theoretically indeterminate. If the value of money is theoretically indeterminate, so, too, is the rate of inflation. The value of money and the rate of inflation are simply, as Fischer Black understood, whatever people in the aggregate expect them to be. Nevertheless, our basic mental processes for understanding how central banks can use an interest-rate instrument to control the value of money are carryovers from an earlier epoch when the value of money was determined, most of the time and in most places, by convertibility, either actual or expected, into gold or silver. The interest-rate instrument of central banks was not primarily designed as a method for controlling the value of money; it was the mechanism by which the central bank could control the amount of reserves on its balance sheet and the amount of gold or silver in its vaults. There was only an indirect connection – at least until the 1920s — between a central bank setting its interest-rate instrument to control its balance sheet and the effect on prices and inflation. The rules of monetary policy developed under a gold standard are not necessarily applicable to an economic system in which the value of money is fundamentally indeterminate.
Viewed from this perspective, the Neo-Fisherian Revolution appears as a kind of reductio ad absurdum of the present confused state of monetary theory in which the price level and the rate of inflation are entirely subjective and determined totally by expectations.

Friday, July 24, 2015

Germany and Europe

The Return of the Ugly German by Joschka Fischer

Depression’s Advocates by J. Bradford DeLong


Sunday, July 19, 2015

Friday, July 17, 2015

Draghi, Greece, Marx, Lenin and Spain

Draghi Makes His Case by J.W. Mason

Greece’s Surrender: A Return to 1919, or to 1905? by John Cassidy

In the Marxist intellectual tradition, from which many senior members of Syriza hail, progress comes about gradually. To overthrow the existing order, you have to first mobilize the masses by stripping back the democratic veil and showing the real workings of the system: only then will the “objective conditions” be ripe for revolutionary change. Tsipras and Syriza didn’t create the conditions for change. But in bringing Greece to the brink, and demonstrating that its creditors were willing to see it collapse if it didn’t buckle to their demands, they did, arguably, succeed in showing up the eurozone as a deflationary straightjacket dominated by creditors. And they did this with all of the world watching. “One must know who the enemy is, in order to fight the enemy,” Alex Andreou, a Greek blogger who is sympathetic to Tsipras, wrote last week. “Syriza has achieved that. Now, it is over to you, Spain. Take what we’ve learned and apply it wisely.” 
Under this analysis, Syriza’s surrender wasn’t necessarily an ignominious one. As Lenin commented of the failed 1905 revolution in Russia, it was a retreat for a new attack, which ultimately proved successful. “I’m not going to sugarcoat this and pass it off as a success story,” Tsipras said to parliament on Wednesday, prior to the vote, acknowledging that the spending cuts and tax increases contained in the agreement would deal another blow to the Greek economy. However, that wasn’t the full story, Tsipras insisted. “We have left a heritage of dignity and democracy to Europe,” he said. “This fight will bear fruit.” 
Only time will tell if that was wishful thinking.

The Stanford Prison Experiment

Germany and Greece.

The trailer.

Friday, July 10, 2015

Greece, competitiveness, adjustment and excess unemployment

Austerity is an integral part of the Greek tragedy by Simon Wren-Lewis
Under flexible exchange rates this competitiveness adjustment could happen immediately. Things are not quite so simple in a monetary union: competitiveness cannot immediately adjust because of wage and price rigidities. A period of ‘excess unemployment’ will be required to push wages and prices down if the country is uncompetitive in relation to required primary surpluses. However the excess unemployment can be relatively modest. In fact, because of the structure of the standard Phillips curve, it is much more efficient to achieve gains in competitiveness gradually through a measured increase in unemployment than quickly through a rapid rise in unemployment, for reasons I outlined here when talking about Latvia. 
To achieve this efficient outcome may well require the government to reduce its primary deficits gradually, because without this fiscal support while competitiveness adjusts output could fall rapidly. This in turn will require more government borrowing, and if the government cannot do this from the markets, the IMF or other governments should step in to ensure this efficient adjustment can take place and avoid the waste and suffering of unnecessary unemployment. 
This is what failed to happen in the case of Greece.

Needed: Large Greek Devaluation or Large-Scale Transfers to Greece. With Bonus Godwin's Law Violation! by Brad DeLong

Austerity and the Greek Depression by Paul Krugman


Sunday, July 05, 2015

Greece and Mason

More of 

What Greece Could Do by JW Mason

I liked these bits:
"And with respect to the external balance, the evidence, both historical and contemporary, suggests that financial markets do not in fact punish defaulters. (And why should they? — the extinction of unserviceable debt almost by definition makes a government a better credit risk post-default, and capitalists are no more capable of putting principle ahead of profit in this case than in others). The costs of default, rather, are the punishment imposed by the creditors, in this case by the ECB. The actual cost of default is being paid already — in the form of shuttered Greek banks, the result of the refusal of the Bank of Greece to extend them the liquidity they need to honor depositors’ withdrawal requests."
and
"1. The Greek government takes control of the Bank of Greece. It replaces the BoG’s current leadership — holdovers from the old conservative government, appointed at the 11th hour when Syriza was on the brink of power — with suitably qualified people who support the program of Greece’s elected government. The argument is made that the central bank has abused its mandate, and failed in its fundamental duty to maintain the integrity of the banking system, in order to advance a political agenda. 
Either legislation could be passed explicitly subordinating the BoG to the elected government, or use could be made of existing provisions for removal of central bank officials for cause. The latter may not be feasible and we don’t want to get bogged down in formalities. Central bankers have critical public function and if they won’t do it, they must be replaced with others who will. Whatever the law may say.

2. The new Bank of Greece leadership commit publicly to maintain the integrity of the Greek payments system, to protect deposits in Greek banks and to prevent bank runs — the same commitment the ECB has repeatedly made for banks elsewhere in Europe. The Greek government asserts its rights to license banks and resolve bank failures. Capital controls are imposed. Greek banks reopen.

3. If necessary, the BoG resumes Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) or equivalent loans to Greek banks. While the promise to do this is important, it probably won’t be necessary to actually resume ELA on any significant scale because: 
– removing the previous threats to withdraw support from Greek banks will end the bank run and probably lead to the voluntary return of deposits to Greek banks.
– capital controls and, if necessary, continued limits on cash withdrawals, block any channels for deposits to leave the Greek banking system.
– resumption of Greek payments to public employees, pensioners, etc., to be soon followed by resumed economic growth, will automatically increase the deposit base of Greek banks."

Friday, July 03, 2015

Oxi: Mason and Waldman on Greece

What Greece Could Do by J.W. Mason

Waldman and I were born the same year.

Greece by Steve Randy Waldman

Monday, June 22, 2015

Obama on Marc Maron's podcast

Obama on WTF with Marc Maron

I'm a longtime fan. (Same with Galifiainakis.)

Blogpost about Maron from back in 2008.

Great how Obama said he liked Pryor, Gregory, Seinfeld and talked about Louis CK.

No Dave Chapelle? George Carlin? Lenny Bruce? Bill Hicks? That would be too comedy nerdish.



Saturday, June 20, 2015

Duda and Market-guided NGDPLT

Kenneth Duda's comment at Jason Smith's blog.

Jason, my name is Ken Duda. I'm a computer programmer who supports Sumner's program at Mercatus.

I am not going to defend Sumner's specific analysis. However I would ask you to think carefully about whether it's possible for a central bank to increase economic activity when there's rising unemployment, falling NGDP (or at least falling NGDP growth), low inflation, and the short-term risk-free nominal interest rate is zero. Krugman, Delong, and Wren-Lewis basically say no, or probably not, maybe the central bank should try, but there's not much it can do. I think they're wrong and the market monetarists are right. The idea that the monopoly issuer of a fiat currency can't induce more nominal spending seems nuts. Sure, the interest rate channel may be dead, but what about the expectations channel? If the central bank tells the market that it will hit its NGDP target come hell or high water, it's just a matter of time, and by the way, the target is rising constantly at say 5% a year, and all this money we're creating will absolutely not be sucked right back out of the economy until NGDP hits that target (or, more precisely, until a prediction market tells us that we'll overshoot our target if we fail to suck the money back out of the economy), then people expect more spending in the future, and that expectation of future spending stimulates spending today, either investment spending to build in anticipation of the future spending, or simply "getting while the getting is good", i.e., buying before prices rise significantly (inflation). 

Again, I am not here to defend Sumner and Sadowski's analysis in this case. However, it breaks my heart to see good intelligent people arguing about style or argument types etc when we just went through 8 years of 10 million people needlessly unemployed, lives shattered, savings lost, when the whole thing could have been averted with better monetary policy. Why can't you, me, Scott, Paul, Simon, Brad all get together, set aside the debate over fiscal stimulus, and demand better monetary policy? Market-guided NGDPLT seems like such a dramatic improvement over high-priest-guided inflation targeting, let's make it happen.

Thanks,
-Ken

Kenneth Duda
Menlo Park, CA
kjd@duda.org

Friday, June 19, 2015

SyFy goes SciFi

Hyperion comes on the heels of several high-profile scripted projects announced by Syfy, including the series pickup of The Magicians, based on Lev Grossman’s best-selling books; the 10-part series The Expanse, airing December 2015 and starring Thomas Jane; Arthur C. Clarke’s epic mini-series Childhood’s End, also set to premiere this December; Aldous Huxley’s classic novel Brave New World with Amblin Television; Gale Anne Hurd’s 13-episode thriller Hunters; David Goyer’s Superman prequel, Krypton; and Incorporated, a futuristic espionage drama from Matt Damon and Ben Affleck.

Wednesday, June 10, 2015

Varoufakis on Piketty

Varoufakis on Piketty

In summary, Varoufakis (2011, 2nd edition 2013) hypothesises that, having already run the war economy successfully, the New Dealers feared, with excellent cause, a post-war recession. In charge of the only major surplus economy left after the war had demolished most of Europe, they understood that the sole alternative to a global recession, which might have threatened an already weakened western capitalism, would be to strengthen aggregate demand within the United States by (a) boosting real wages and (b) recycling America’s aggregate surpluses to Europe and to Japan so as to create the demand that would keep American factories going. If anything, Bretton Woods was the global framework within which this project was embedded. Its fixed exchange rates, capital controls and an underlying international consensus on labour market policies that would keep the wage share above a certain level, were all aspects of the same struggle to prevent the post-war world from slipping back into depression.

Naturally, the resulting wealth and income dynamics reduced inequality, increased the availability of decent jobs, and produced capitalism’s golden age. Was this an aberration? Of course it was not! The Marshall Plan, the Bretton Woods institutions, the strict regulation of banks etc. would not have been politically feasible had capitalism not threatened to commit suicide in the late 1940s, as it does once in a while (the last episode having occurred in 2008). Were these policies and new institutions inevitable? Of course they were not! While the political interventions that had the by-product of reducing income inequality were fully endogenous to the period’s capitalist dynamics, the latter are always indeterminate both in terms of the politics that they engender as well as of their economic outcomes.

Alas, Bretton Woods and the institutions the New Dealers had established in the 1940s could not survive the end of the 1960s. Why? Because they were predicated upon the recycling of American surpluses to Europe and to Asia (see above). Once the United States slipped into a deficit position, some time in 1968, this was no longer possible. America would have either to abandon its hegemonic position, together with the dollar’s ‘exorbitant privilege’, or it would have to find another way of remaining at the centre of global surplus recycling. Or, to quote a phrase coined by Paul Volcker, “if we cannot recycle our surpluses, we might as well recycle other people’s surpluses”.

This is, according to my book’s narrative, why the early 1970s, and the end of Bretton Woods, proved so pivotal: The United States, through its twin deficits, began to absorb from the rest of the world both net exports and surplus capital, therefore ‘closing’ the recycling loop. It provided net exporters (e.g. Germany, Japan and later China) with the aggregate demand they so desperately needed in return for a tsunami of foreign capital (generated in the surplus economies by their net exports to America, and to other economies energised by the United States’ trade deficit).

However, for this tsunami to materialise capital controls had to go, wage inflation in the United States had to drop below that of its competitors, incomes policies had to be jettisoned, and financialisation had to be afforded its foothold. From this perspective, inequality’s resurgence in the 1970s, the never-ending rise of finance at the expense of industry, and the diminution of collective agency around the world, were all symptoms of the reversal in the direction and nature of global surplus recycling. The manner in which by-product ‘inequality’ and by-product ‘financialisation’ coalesced to destabilise capitalism, until it hit the wall in 2008, is a process that several studies have thrown light on in recent times (e.g. see Galbraith, 2012). Professor Piketty’s single-minded effort to construct, at any cost, a simple deterministic argument is, unfortunately, not one of them.

Sunday, June 07, 2015

Brüning and Weimar

Weimar Republic

Brüning expected that the policy of deflation would temporarily worsen the economic situation before it began to improve, quickly increasing the German economy's competitiveness and then restoring its creditworthiness. His long-term view was that deflation would, in any case, be the best way to help the economy. His primary goal was to remove Germany's reparation payments by convincing the Allies that they could no longer be paid.[44] Anton Erkelenz, chairman of the German Democratic Party and a contemporary critic of Brüning, famously said that the policy of deflation is a:

rightful attempt to release Germany from the grip of reparation payments, but in reality it meant nothing else than committing suicide because of fearing death. The deflation policy causes much more damage than the reparation payments of 20 years ... Fighting against Hitler is fighting against deflation, the enormous destruction of production factors.[45] 

In 1933, the American economist Irving Fisher developed the theory of debt deflation. He explained that a deflation causes a decline of profits, asset prices and a still greater decline in the net worth of businesses. Even healthy companies, therefore, may appear over-indebted and facing bankruptcy.[43] The consensus today is that Brüning's policies exacerbated the German economic crisis and the population's growing frustration with democracy, contributing enormously to the increase in support for Hitler's NSDAP.[1]

Tuesday, June 02, 2015

monetary policy

Bernanke on monetary policy and inequality by Steve Randy Waldman

James Bullard came out for NGDP path level targeting.

Clive Crook came out for helicopter drops.


Monday, May 25, 2015

Podemos

Spain’s Local Election Results Reshape Political Landscape
MADRID — Ada Colau, 41, was not even born when Manuela Carmena, 71, joined Spain’s underground Communist party and started her legal career by attacking labor restrictions imposed by Francisco Franco, the Spanish dictator. 
But even if separated by a generation, Ms. Colau and Ms. Carmena both found themselves claiming similar left-wing victories by upstart candidates over Spain’s political establishment, after Sunday’s regional and municipal elections.

Mathiness

Mathiness in the Theory of Economic Growth by Paul M. Rome

Protecting the Norms of Science in Economics by Paul Romer

Tony Yates's thoughts

How 'Mathiness' Made Me Jaded About Economics by Noah Smith

Beating dead horses by Ryan Decker


Saturday, May 23, 2015

inequality



Krugman and Bob Solow discuss Tony Atkinson and his new book on inequality.

Game of Thrones

Finn Jones who plays Loras Tyrell tweets with fans:

"nothing would give Loras or the tyrells more pleasure - to eradicate the snide Lannisters from the power..

..they are the "1percenters" of Westeros - they must be abolished."


Saturday, May 09, 2015

Weimar, Nazis, Social Democrats and Communists

The National Socialists as Conservative Revolutionaries by John Holbo
So you get in a position where there is a kind of two-dimensional struggle: left-right/inside-outside. The Social Democrats were now ‘inside’, the new core of the so-called Weimar coalition that held power through the 20’s. The traditional, Wilhelmine conservative forces were still insiders, by any reasonable calculation. They had tremendous social and institutional leverage everywhere – not to mention most of the money – but they couldn’t compete electorally for a time. Some really strange stuff happened. Some of the most vicious in-fighting was on the left, especially between the social democrats and the communists, starting right in 1918.
From the balcony of the Reichstag building, the SPD leader Philipp Scheidemann proclaimed a German Republic. A couple of hundred meters away, from the balcony of the royal palace, the famed radical socialist and antiwar activist Karl Liebknecht proclaimed a socialist republic. Ebert [a social democrat who didn’t like the suddenness of it all] was furious. He discounted Liebknecht, recently released from the kaiser’s jails, as a wild radical who might just as well have languished longer in prison. But Scheidemann was his close colleague, and no recognized body, no government, not even a political party, had authorized the proclamation of a republic. There had not even been a discussion. (Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy, p. 19)
The Social Democrats where forever fighting with the communists, after that. So, on the one hand, the SD’s were solidifying a grand coalition with more centrist parties, proclaiming women’s rights, a free press, freedom of religion, an expanded welfare state; on the other hand, they were forced to use the proto-Nazi Freikorps to put down the Spartacist League, leading to the murders of Leibknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. Forced because they literally had no police/military alternative. Right-wing paramilitaries were the only available muscle. The SD’s had to work with the powers-that-still-were. Obviously the correct conclusion to draw is not that the SD’s were really right-wingers themselves – or that the Freikorps had left-wing sympathies. Each group tried to use the other. The SD’s wanted to save the Weimar Republic, by any means necessary. The Freikorps wanted to murder communists and gain the sort of legitimacy that might allow them, eventually, to overthrow the Republic – to whose existence they were not reconciled.
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Sort of like Cersei arming the Sparrows and bringing back the Faith Militant who turn on her.

Wednesday, May 06, 2015

Fed Fail


Yet by the standard of the pre-2007 period we have a depressed level and anemic growth, combined with acceptance of these as the new normal. Thus the North Atlantic is on track to have thrown away 10% of their potential wealth. And there have been insufficient changes in financial-sector regulation or in automatic stabilizers or in other institutions to keep the North Atlantic from once again developing the vulnerabilities it turned out to have in 2007.
DeLong Speech

Sunday, May 03, 2015

Guardians of the Galaxy



Peter Quill's Walkman held up remarkably well.