Escaping liquidity traps: Lessons from the UK’s 1930s escape by Nicholas Crafts

Nevillenomics by Krugman

Nicholas Crafts has a really interesting piece about UK economic policy in the 1930s. The gist is that monetary policy drove recovery through the expectations channel; the Bank of England managed to credibly promise to be irresponsible, that is, to generate inflation. 

But how did they do that? Crafts argues that it was two things: the BoE was not independent, it was just an arm of the Treasury, and the Treasury had a known need to generate some inflation to bring down high debt levels. 

This is very closely related to Gauti Eggertsson’s analysis of Japanese policy(pdf) over the same period: there too the lack of central bank independence combined with a fiscal imperative made it possible to change monetary expectations in an unorthodox way, which was exactly what was needed (although they should have skipped the invading Manchuria part). 

All of this reinforces the important point that, as I put it early in this crisis, we’ve entered a looking-glass world in which virtue is vice and prudence is folly, and in which doing the responsible thing is a recipe for economic failure. 

And it also bodes surprisingly well for Abenomics, which might work in part precisely because of what everyone imagines to be Japan’s biggest problem, its huge public debt.