Fed Fail: labor force participation rate edition

America’s Workforce: The Mystery of the “Missing Millions” Deepens by John Cassdiy

The Labor Department’s participation-rate figures tell the story, but they don’t really convey what it means in human terms. For that, it’s useful to do a bit of back-of-the-envelope arithmetic and convert them into an estimate of the number of workers who have gone “missing” from the labor force, for whatever reason. Early last year, based on a report from the Congressional Budget Office, I did that exercise and came up with a figure of roughly six million, which isn’t much short of the entire population of the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area. 

Based on the latest job figures, six million might even be an underestimate of the number of missing workers. In December, 2007, the participation rate was sixty-six per cent, more than three percentage points above the current figure of 62.7 per cent. If the rate had rebounded to its pre-recession level, there would now be roughly eight million more people in the labor force.

Fed under pressure

As Federal Reserve Selects New Top Officials, Coalition Calls for Public Input by Binyamin Appelbaum

Kockerlakota and the North Dakota oil boom

Kocherlakota dissents. I believe his turn about first came when he visited the North Dakota "man camps" of the oil boom.

Oct. 29 FOMC statement:

Voting against the action was Narayana Kocherlakota, who believed that, in light of continued sluggishness in the inflation outlook and the recent slide in market-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations, the Committee should commit to keeping the current target range for the federal funds rate at least until the one-to-two-year ahead inflation outlook has returned to 2 percent and should continue the asset purchase program at its current level.

'The Overnighters' shows dark side of North Dakota oil boom

Fed Fail

When will they learn? by Ryan Avent

The Fed

The Fed and Inequality by Dean Baker

Obama's biggest economic policy mistake by Yglesias

Blame Obama for bad monetary policy, not Republicans by Ygelsias

Federal Reserve resists hawkish signal, continues to view economy as needing their monetary support…and that’s as it should be. by Jared Bernstein

The Fed is out with their statement and the words “considerable time” live to see another day!

Fed and poverty reduction

A photo for Kervick

NYT on the Mark on the Fed and Interest Rates by Dean Baker

First, the Fed's actions on interest rates swamp the importance of almost every government spending program designed to help low and moderate income people. There were big battles in Washington in the last couple of years over Republican proposals to cut food stamps by $4 billion a year. If the Fed keeps the unemployment rate one percentage point higher than a level it could reach without triggering an inflationary spiral then it would be preventing close to 3 million people from working. (A rule of thumb is that for the number of people not currently in the labor force who find a job is roughly equal to the number of unemployed people who find a job.)
...
We have been here before. Back in the mid-1990s the absolute consensus in the economics profession was that the unemployment rate could not get much below 6.0 percent without triggering inflationary pressures. This was a view held not only by conservative economists, but by liberals like Janet Yellen, Alan Blinder, and Paul Krugman. Fortunately, Federal Reserve Board Chair Alan Greenspan was not a mainstream economist. He argued there was no evidence of inflationary pressures, therefore he saw no reason to keep the unemployment rate from falling below the 6.0 percent threshold.

The unemployment rate fell below 5.0 percent in 1997 and was at 4.0 percent as a year-round average in 2000. Not only were millions of people to get jobs who would not have otherwise been able to work, workers at the middle and bottom of the wage ladder saw sustained real wage growth for the first time since the early 1970s. And, there was a huge swing from budget deficits to budget surpluses, giving the country the budget surpluses that the Clintonites always celebrate.

monetary policy

NYT on the Mark on the Fed and Interest Rates by Dean Baker

We have been here before. Back in the mid-1990s the absolute consensus in the economics profession was that the unemployment rate could not get much below 6.0 percent without triggering inflationary pressures. This was a view held not only by conservative economists, but by liberals like Janet Yellen, Alan Blinder, and Paul Krugman. Fortunately, Federal Reserve Board Chair Alan Greenspan was not a mainstream economist. He argued there was no evidence of inflationary pressures, therefore he saw no reason to keep the unemployment rate from falling below the 6.0 percent threshold.

I wonder if Yellen, Blinder and Krugman preferred more government spending in comensation for rising rates, i.e. they wanted more government.

Better late than never but early is better still by Scott Sumner

OMO

DeLong retweets Harless

Conventional def'n of monetary policy (OMOs) imparts fiscalist bias by defining mon. pol. as something that inherently works against itself

bubbly stock market? and Fed Fail

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD YOU WORRY THAT THE STOCK MARKET IS "TOO HIGH"?: THE HONEST BROKER FOR THE WEEK OF AUGUST 16, 2014 by DeLong

The 10.8 trillion failures of the Federal Reserve by Rex Nutting

WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) — The conventional wisdom says the Federal Reserve is keeping interest rates so low that it doesn’t pay to play it safe, and that it’s encouraging investors to do all sorts of crazy things to earn a higher yield. 

Supposedly, the central bank is forcing investors pump up stocks, junk bonds, farm land and all the other bubbles you’ve been reading about. 

It’s a nice story, but the data show that U.S. investors are still conservative about where they put their money. 

Just how conservative are they? 

Data from the little-noticed financial accounts report show the American people have $10.8 trillion parked in cash, bank accounts and money-market funds that pay little or no interest. 

At the end of the first quarter, low-yielding assets totaled 84.5% of annual disposable personal income, the highest share in 23 years. Sure, people need to keep some money handy to pay their bills and some folks might have a few hundred or a few thousand in a rainy-day fund, but no one needs immediate access to the equivalent of 11 months of income. 

In essence, there’s $10.8 trillion stuffed into mattresses. 

That $10.8 trillion hoard represents a failure of Fed policy. 

Since the Fed began quantitative easing in September 2012, U.S. households have socked away $1.17 trillion in their low-yield accounts. That means that 95% of the Fed’s $1.24 trillion QE3 ended up not in bubbly markets but in a safe and boring bank account. 

Since the recession began more than six years ago, the Fed has been trying to encourage people to put their money to work in the economy. That’s why the Fed has kept interest rates low and has been buying up trillions of dollars worth of relatively safe securities, hoping to push us to take on a little more risk. 

After all, an economy can’t really grow if no one’s willing to gamble on the future. 

But many of us don’t want to. We are still afraid, so we prefer to put a large part of our savings in assets that are guaranteed, like FDIC-insured bank accounts, or into money-market funds whose sponsor guarantees the return of the principle.

The point of Fed policy has been to get people either to consume more or to lend their money to others who would invest it productively. Either way, aggregate demand would rise, boosting the economy and creating more jobs. 

The Fed can point to some successes: Consumer spending and business investment have bounced back, but both are somewhat weaker than they usually are coming out of recessions. 

The majority of Americans are doing their patriotic bit, spending nearly everything they earn. A recent report from the Fed showed that little more than a third of families are able to save any money at all after they pay their bills each month. More than 60% say they couldn’t come up with $400 in an emergency without borrowing or pawning something. 

Most people are saving next to nothing, while just a few are saving a significant amount. Those who do save are saving a ton — more than $1.2 trillion a year. 

According to the Fed’s financial accounts data and definitions, the personal savings rate has averaged about 10% of disposable income since the recession ended, up from around 7% before the recession. That means upper-middle class and wealthy Americans are saving nearly $400 billion more a year than they used to. 

That extra $400 billion would be a boon to the economy if it were being consumed or invested.
But high-income Americans don’t want to consume any more than they already do. The upper-middle class is desperately saving for their kids’ college and for their own retirement. And the truly wealthy have everything they desire, so they are saving a lot, buying equities, bonds and real estate, and adding to their bank balance. 

In theory, the money they deposit in the bank should flow into the economy when the bank makes a loan. But bank lending to businesses has been very soft, up just $160 billion in the past year. 

Businesses haven’t been relying on bank loans anyway, because their internal cash flow has been more than adequate to finance their investments in new structures, equipment and intellectual property. Since the recession ended, internal funds have exceeded capital spending in every quarter. 

When companies do borrow, they use the proceeds to buy back shares or to acquire whole companies, neither of which adds to the stock of our national wealth. Since the recession ended, corporations have spent about twice as much money on buying their own stock and the shares of acquired companies as they have borrowed from banks. 

Corporations have been buying so many shares that they haven’t raised any money on net in the stock market from households in years. In fact, households have been raising money from corporations, to the tune of about $450 billion a year. 

So, even though U.S. households are saving lots of money, very little of it is flowing through to the economy. There are 10.8 trillion reasons to think the Fed has failed to get the American people to take on more risk.

reverse repurchase agreement facility

The ON RRP Facility and Post-Liftoff Fed Policy by Stephen Williamson

(via Thoma)

Fed Watch: FOMC statement

Fed Watch: FOMC statement

Fed as Dr. Benway

Steely Dan got their name from the talking dildo that appeared in Beat writer William Burrough's Naked Lunch. The book also has a character named Dr. Benway.



In a recent post J.W. Mason quoted Dr. Benway in reference to self-induced economic problems.

“Now, boys, you won’t see this operation performed very often and there’s a reason for that…. You see it has absolutely no medical value. No one knows what the purpose of it originally was or if it had a purpose at all. Personally I think it was a pure artistic creation from the beginning. 

“Just as a bull fighter with his skill and knowledge extricates himself from danger he has himself invoked, so in this operation the surgeon deliberately endangers his patient, and then, with incredible speed and celerity, rescues him from death at the last possible split second….

He imagines Larry Summers as in the Benway role:

Interestingly, Dr. Benway was worried about technological obsolescence too. “Soon we’ll be operating by remote control on patients we never see…. We’ll be nothing but button pushers,” etc. The Dr. Benways of finance like to fret about how robots will replace human labor. I wonder how much of that is a way of hiding from the knowledge that what cheap and abundant capital renders obsolete, is the capitalist?

EDIT: I'm really liking the idea of Larry Summers as Dr. Benway. It fits the way all the talk when he was being pushed for Fed chair was about how great he would be in a financial crisis. How would everyone known how smart he was -- how essential -- if he hadn't done so much to create a crisis to solve?

but I think the Federal Reserve Bank would be more accurate. As Frances Coppola tweeted:

Working my way through FOMC minutes from 2004 to 2008. Fascinating. The FOMC members primary concern is always exactly the same.
Their concern is always that core inflation will "fail to moderate" - even when staff projections are that it will fall.
But they are always really upbeat about growth, even when staff projections are that growth will fall. They ignore their own staff.
And they ignore markets, too. Investors were pricing in lower rates due to falling growth expectations from Jan 2007 onwards.
But the FOMC? Nah. Main risk in their view was inflation (even though it was falling). They kept interest rates elevated.

 Investors were rational in 2007, but turned irrational in the face of Obama. As Robert Waldmann writes:

I am assuming that, like inflation expectations, inflation perceptions have delinked from reality recently. I really really should find data on perceived inflation (which is out there somewhere). I also have to come up with a story for why this happened just in time to save us from deflation. 

I give the credit to Fox news. A large fraction of people in the US rely on Fox News (often indirectly as repeated by friends and relatives). They are out of touch with reality — there expectations and perceptions are what Roger Ailes wants them to be. He thinks inflation is bad even though in a depressed economy in the liquidity trap it is good. Therefore Fox News convinces people that inflation has been and will be high. The representative consumer is only partly living in the Fox bubble so perceived and expected inflation are moderate. Then finally actual inflation is low but positive.

FOMC during the bubble defltation

Frances Coppola tweets:

Working my way through FOMC minutes from 2004 to 2008. Fascinating. The FOMC members primary concern is always exactly the same.

Their concern is always that core inflation will "fail to moderate" - even when staff projections are that it will fall.

But they are always really upbeat about growth, even when staff projections are that growth will fall. They ignore their own staff.

And they ignore markets, too. Investors were pricing in lower rates due to falling growth expectations from Jan 2007 onwards.

But the FOMC? Nah. Main risk in their view was inflation (even though it was falling). They kept interest rates elevated.

Fed and community bankers

Irwin tweets:

Lawmakers obsessed with getting a community banker on Fed board. Fed watcher/monetary types utterly indifferent on this.

Maxximilian Seijo:

Republicans keep asking about community bankers rather than the unemployed.

Should Janet Yellen Be Giving Us Stock Picks? by Neil Irwin

creeping nationalization of the financial system

Creeping Nationalisation by Frances Coppola

It's All But Official: There is No 2% Inflation Target by David Beckworth

Interesting response by Andy Harless

Washington Super-Whale, Janet Yellen

NYTimes commenter:

"Central bank power really is an illusion, to some extent. In extremis, the market can trump that power..."

Harpooning Ben Bernanke by Krugman

MOBY BEN, OR, THE WASHINGTON SUPER-WHALE: HEDGE FUNDIES, THE FEDERAL RESERVE, AND BERNANKE-HATRED

by DeLong

In February 2012, a number of hedge fund traders noted one particular index--CDX IG 9--that seemed to be underpriced. It seemed to be cheaper to buy credit default protection on the 125 companies that made the index by buying the index than by buying protection on the 125 companies one by one. This was an obvious short-term moneymaking opportunity: Buy the index, sell its component short, in short order either the index will rise or the components will fall in value, and then you will be able to quickly close out your position with a large profit.

But February passed, and March passed, and April rolled in, and the gap between the price of CDX IG 9 and what the hedge fund traders thought it should be grew. And their bosses asked them questions, like: "Shouldn't this trade have converged by now?" "Have you missed something?" "How much longer do you want to tie up our risk-bearing capacity here?" "Isn't it time to liquidate--albeit at a loss?"

So the hedge fund traders began asking who their counterparty was. It seemed that they all had the same counterparty. And so they began calling their counterparty "the London Whale". They kept buying. And the London Whale kept selling. And so they had no opportunity to even begin to liquidate their positions and their mark-to-market losses grew, and the risk they had exposed their firms to grew.

So they got annoyed.

And they went public, hoping that they could induce the bosses of the London Whale to force him to unwind his possession, in which case they would profit immensely not just when the value of CDX IG 9 returned to its fundamental but by price pressure as the London Whale had to find people to transact with. And so we had 'London Whale' Rattles Debt Market, and similar stories

The London Whale was Bruno Iksil. He had been losing, and rolling double or nothing, and losing again for months. His boss, Ina Drew, took a look at his positions. They found they had a choice: they could hold the portfolio and thus go all-in, or they could fold. They could hold CDX IG 9 until maturity--make a fortune if a fewer-than-expected number of its 125 companies went bankrupt, and lose J.P. Morgan Chase entirely to bankruptcy if more did. Or they could take their $6 billion loss and go home. They could either take their losses, or sing "Luck, Be a Lady Tonight!" and bet J.P. Morgan Chase on a single crapshoot. After all, what could they do if the bet went wrong and they had to eat losses at maturity? J.P. Morgan Chase couldn't print money. So Drew stood Iksil down, and the hedge fund traders had their happy ending.

In late 2008, the Treasury bond went haywire. The interest rate on the Ten Year Nominal Treasury bond fell to 2.1% in the panic--clearly overpriced. In the late 1990s with the debt-to-annual-GDP ratio on the decline the Treasury bond had traded between 5% and 7%. In the 2000s with a weak economy the Treasury bond had traded between 4% and 5%. With the Federal debt exploding even faster than it had around 1990, it seemed to hedge fund traders very clear that the long-term fundamental value of the Ten-Year Treasury bond probably carried an interest rate of 7%, or more--and was at the very least more than 5%. So smart hedge fund traders shorted Treasuries, and waited for the Treasury Bond to return to its fundamental value.

And they ran into the widowmaker.

So they scrambled around, wondering: "Why did the interest rate on the Ten-Year Treasury peak at 4%? And why has it gone down since then? And why won't it go back to its 5%-7% fundamental." And they looked around. And they found Ben Bernanke:

The Washington Super-Whale.

He had printed-up reserve deposits, and used them to buy Treasury Bonds, and in so doing, they thought, had pushed the price of Treasuries up well beyond their fundamentals. Yet rather than easing off, taking his lumps, and letting the market "clear" he kept buying and buying and buying and buying, leaving the hedge fund traders with larger and larger and larger short positions in Treasuries that had to be carried at a loss. And every year that they carry those positions is a -2% times the size of the long leg negative entry in their cash flow.

Bruno Iksil, they thought, had been pulled up short by his boss Ina Drew's unwillingness to bet the firm and risk bankruptcy. Ben Bernanke, they thought, ought to have been pulled up short by his regard for financial stability--by his promise to keep inflation at its target, for the counterpart to J.P. Morgan Chase's bankruptcy and liquidation would be the national bankruptcy that is another episode of inflation like the 1970s. But Ben Bernanke wasn't pulled up short by the risk of inflation. He had no supervising CEO. And he dominated the Federal Open Market Committee.

But what Bernanke was doing, they thought, was as unprofessional as it would have been for Ina Drew to tell Bruno Iksil: "You turn out to have made a large directional bet that we can sell unhedged protection and profit? Let's see if you are right: let it ride!"

And so they went public with the Washington Super-Whale, as they had gone public with the London Whale. Perhaps somewhere out there was an equivalent of Jamie Dimon who could tell Bernanke that it was time to unwind the Federal Reserve's balance sheet now? Jeremy Stein, perhaps?

From my perspective, of course, the hedge fundies' analogy between the London Whale and the Washington Super-Whale is all wrong--the hedge fundies are thinking partial-equilibrium when they should be thinking general equilibrium. CDX IG 9 has a well-defined fundamental value: the payouts should each of the 125 companies go bankrupt times the chance that they will. What Bruno Iksil does does not affect that fundamental value. He can bet, and drive the price, but he cannot change the fundamental.

But the Washington Super-Whale is different.

In a healthy economy, the Ten-Year Treasury Bond does have a well-defined fundamental. When the economy is healthy enough that pricing power reverts to workers and keeping inflation from rising is job #1 for the Federal Reserve, the level of the Federal Funds rate now and in the future is pinned down by the requirement to hit the inflation target. And the fundamental of the Ten-Year Treasury Bond is then the expected value over the bond's lifetime of the future Federal Funds rate plus the appropriate ex ante duration risk premium.

But when the economy is depressed, like now? When market appetite for short-term cash at a zero interest rate is unlimited, like now? When workers have no pricing power, and so wage inflation is subdued, like now? The Federal Reserve is not J.P. Morgan Chase. It is not a highly-leveraged financial institution that must worry about holding too much duration risk. As Glenn Rudebusch once said:

Our business model here at the Fed is simple: (i) print reserve deposits that cost us 0 (OK. 0.25%/yer), (2) invest them in interest-paying bonds that we then hold to maturity, (3) PROFIT!!

And the more quantitative easing the Fed undertakes and the larger is its balance sheet the larger is the amount of money the Federal Reserve makes on its portfolio, without running any risks--as long as the economy remains depressed.

The Federal Reserve, you see, is unlike J.P. Morgan Chase: the Federal Reserve does print money.

But, the hedge fundies say: "What if the economy recovers and starts to boom? What if inflation shoots up? The Fed could loose $500 billion on its portfolio as it moves to control inflation! Why doesn't that fear that?"

The Fed does not fear that. That is what it is aiming for. The Fed is charged by law with "promot[ing] effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long term interest rates". A full-employment economy is not something to be feared but something to be welcomed. And a $500 billion mark-to-market loss on its current portfolio? The Fed has given $500 billion to the Treasury, as a present, over the past decade. It is not a profit-making private bank. It is a central bank charged with "promot[ing] effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long term interest rates".

"But," the hedgies say, "George Soros! The Bank of England held the pound sterling away from fundamentals in 1992, and George Soros bet against them and they could not maintain the parity and George Soros took them for $2 billion! Why aren't we doing the same?" Ah. But George Soros took $2 billion from the Bank of England because its political masters told it to stand down: "We will not," they said, "defend the ERM pound parity at the price of bringing on a deep recession and mass unemployment." Who do the hedgies imagine are the Fed's political masters who will tell it to shift and adopt policies that will bring on even massier unemployment? Rand Paul?

There is a reason that the trade of shorting the bonds of a sovereign issuer of a global reserve currency in a depressed economy is called "the widowmaker".

Yellen

Transcript of Yellen and Lagarde Comments at IMF Event

Chair Yellen's press conference

BINYAMIN APPELBAUM. Binya Appelbaum, New York Times. You’ve spoken about\ the sense that the recession has done permanent damage to the economic output and you’ve reduced gradually over time your forecast of long-term growth. I am curious to know to what extent you think stronger monetary and/or fiscal policy could reverse those trends. Are we stuck with slower growth? Is there something that you can do about it? If so, what? If not, why?

CHAIR YELLEN. Well, I think part of the reason that we are seeing slower growth in potential output may reflect the fact that capital investment has been very weak during the downturn in the long recovery that we’re experiencing. So, a diminished contribution from capital formation to growth does make a negative contribution to growth. And as the economy picks up, I certainly would hope to see that contribution restored. So, I think that’s one of the factors that’s been operative. Of course, we’ve had unusually long duration unemployment. A very large fraction of those unemployed have been unemployed for more than six months. And there is the fear that those individuals find it harder to gain employment, that their attachment to the labor force may diminish over time and the networks of contacts that are—they have that are helpful in gaining employment can begin to erode over time. We could see what’s known as hysteresis, where individuals, because they haven’t had jobs for a long time, find themselves permanently outside the labor force. My hope would be that as—and my expectation is that as the economy recovers, we will see some repair of that, that many of those individuals who were long-term unemployed or those who are now counted as out of the labor force would take jobs if the economy is stronger and would be drawn back in again, but it is conceivable that there is some permanent damage there to them, to their own well-being, their family’s well-being, and the economy’s potential. 

Me: Strong monterary and/or fiscal policy can do a reverese hysteresis.

economic tradeoffs?

Financial Stability and Monetary Policy: Happy Marriage or Untenable Union? by John C. Williams

low interest rates

For Bonds, This Time is Different by Krugman

Bloomberg has an interesting piece on how high bond prices and low yields have been shocking investors who relied on old models. Some of this, I suspect, is because many people still — after all these years — haven’t wrapped their minds around the implications of a zero-lower=bound economy and the risks of a low-inflation trap. 

But it’s also true that structural change is happening fast — just not the kind of structural change people like to talk about. Never mind the stuff about skill mismatches and all that. What’s really happening fast is the demographic transition, with Europe very quickly turning Japanese:

And the US, although growing faster, also turning down sharply. 

Add to this the fact that what we thought was normal actually depended on ever-growing household debt, and it becomes clear that historical expectations about normal interest rates are likely to be way off. You don’t have to believe in secular stagnation (although you should take it very seriously) to accept that low rates are very likely the new normal.

Tim Duy on how Fed Policy keeps rates low by Scott Sumner

Garrett pointed me to a very good Tim Duy post on Fed policy:

The Federal Reserve has set reasonably clear expectations that rates will remain low for a long time. That path, however, seems to be a consequence of doing too little now to ensure a stronger recovery. In other words, the Fed seems to be taking a lower-rate future as a given rather than as a result of insufficient policy. Instead of acting to ensure a stronger forecast, they seem more interesting in acting to lock-in the lower path of activity. And that in turn will tend to lock in a low level of long-term rates. This, I think, is the best explanation for the inability of markets to sustain higher rates. It is simply reasonable to expect that the conditions which justify higher long rates will be met with tighter policy sufficient to contain growth to something closer to the current path of output than to current estimates of potential output. 

This is actually pretty close to Milton Friedman’s 1998 claim that rates in Japan were low because money had been tight. Or Nick Rowe’s upward sloping IS curve. Duy doesn’t use the term “tight money”, but the phrase “doing too little now to ensure a stronger recovery” implies money is tighter than Duy and I might consider optimal, and that easier money would eventually lead to higher rates. If you put aside my idiosyncratic definition of “easy” and “tight” money (I use NGDP growth, not interest rates and money growth as policy indicators), my views are actually similar close to those of a mainstream macroeconomist like Tim Duy. The substance of what we are saying on monetary policy and interest rates (and also monetary offset) is very close, once you get beyond framing effects. 

Have our views always been close on these issues? I’m not sure.

The Fed and the Financial Crisis by Yglesias