Inspecting the Mechanism: Dealing with Sudden Stops, the Euro Periphery, the Exorbitant Privilege-Possessing Floating-Rate Sovereigns of the Global North, and the Debt by DeLong

Currency Regimes, Capital Flows, and Crises (Wonkish) by Krugman

"The sense of entitlement carried by savers in our society would put any welfare queen to shame."
(or a Balance of Payments Problem / Global Savings Glut)


Krugman blogs about a Randy Waldman post and they are both getting at what I've been trying to describe by way of a Grand Unified Theory (GUT) of "late capitalism." Krugman writes:

He then argues that the”natural” real rate of interest — the interest rate that would match savings and investment at full employment — has been negative for quite a while, and that we’re only seeing this now because various bubbles and deregulatory schemes have masked the reality.

What he doesn’t say, but immediately strikes anyone who knows some of the history here, is that this amounts to a return of the “secular stagnation” hypothesis that was popular in the early postwar years; the hypothesis was that there was a fundamental excess of desired savings over desired investment, and that this would require government intervention on a sustained basis to achieve full employment.

That hypothesis proved wrong at the time, but that doesn’t mean it couldn’t be true now. And I’m somewhat sympathetic to the view that it might indeed be true.

Waldman goes on to suggest that high income inequality is what’s driving this — he has a little parable involving bakers and bread that ultimately comes down to the rich being satiated while the poor cannot afford to buy.

OK, I like little parables. But I have a problem with this one, for one simple reason: any such story, basically an underconsumptionist story, would seem to depend on the notion that rising inequality has led to rising savings. And you just don’t see that. Here’s private saving as a share of GDP:

Obviously it jumped up after the housing bust, but until then it was actually declining, and even now it’s below historic highs. I just don’t see how to make the underconsumption story work.

But then the question is, why do we find it so hard to achieve full employment even with saving somewhat low by historical standards. And the answer seems clear: it’s the trade deficit. America in the 70s and 80s could have high savings, not hugely strong investment, but still have full employment because trade deficits weren’t as large compared with the economy as they are now.

And this in turn means that the savings glut possibly making the natural real rate negative is actually originating abroad, not at home.

Do you sort of see why I’m a hawk on China policy?

A Balance of Payments Problem (BOPP)

Financial Big Lies by Krugman

Barry Ritholtz has a fine piece in the WaPo taking off from Michael Bloomberg’s recent venture into the rewriting of history. And I think Ritholtz’s Big Lie framework is just perfect.

After all, the way to understand the “Barney Frank did it” school of thought about the crisis is that it’s an attempt to turn a huge defeat for conservative ideas into a win. The reality of the financial crisis was that deregulation — which was part of a broader rightward shift in policies that played a large role in creating rapid growth in income inequality — led to an economic catastrophe of the kind that just didn’t happen during the 50 years or so when we had effective bank regulation.

So the right’s answer is to claim not just that the government did it, but that it caused the crisis by its attempts to reduce inequality! It’s kind of a masterstroke, in an evil way.

And I think it’s important to recognize the motives here. By all means let’s debunk the claims on substantive grounds, which Mike Konczal does very well. But they’ll just keep spouting these claims, and make up new ones, so you need to understand the fundamental bad faith that is driving the whole debate.

I agree but Ritholz writes:

Fed Chair Alan Greenspan dropped rates to 1 percent — levels not seen for half a century — and kept them there for an unprecedentedly long period. This caused a spiral in anything priced in dollars (i.e., oil, gold) or credit (i.e., housing) or liquidity driven (i.e., stocks).

There was also Bernanke's Global Savings Glut. Is there a problem with a system where low interest rates used to counter deflationary pressures cause bubbles? What if those low interest rates were used to invest in productive enterprises?

Somewhat related, Krugman blogs about a Gavyn Davies piece:

Gavyn Davies has a very good piece today offering another way to think about the euromess. I say “another way to think” advisedly — his analysis of the basics is, as far as I can tell, identical to mine, but he offers a different angle of approach that may be better than the route the rest of us have been taking. Here’s Davies:

It is normal to discuss the sovereign debt problem by focusing on the sustainability of public debt in the peripheral economies. But it can be more informative to view it as a balance of payments problem. Taken together, the four most troubled nations (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) have a combined current account deficit of $183 billion. Most of this deficit is accounted for by the public sector deficits of these countries, since their private sectors are now roughly in financial balance. Offsetting these deficits, Germany has a current account surplus of $182 billion, or about 5 per cent of its GDP.

The euro problem can then be defined a finding a way (1) to finance these imbalances in the short run (2) end the imbalances over the medium run.

It’s also worth noting that we’re not talking about imbalances that have been going on forever.The internal imbalances of Europe are a recent development, coinciding with and almost surely caused in large part by the creation of the euro itself (GIPS is Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain):

So how are these imbalances to be closed? European leaders have been completely unwilling to confront that question. Yesterday’s big Times piece offers a portrait of leaders — Trichet in particular — engaged in furious denial. It wasn’t just the insistence on Trichet’s part that no default could ever happen. The European Central Bank also went all in for the doctrine of expansionary austerity, aka belief in the confidence fairy.

And what Davies’s post drives home is that implicitly at least European leaders went in for the doctrine of immaculate transfer — in effect, they wanted to believe that the huge payments imbalances could be ended without major changes in relative prices.

So what’s happening instead is forced austerity in the deficit countries, not matched by expansionary policies elsewhere, in a low aggregate inflation environment — the ECB actually raised rates! — that makes adjustment almost impossible. The result is a eurozone headed for recession, and one in which a breakup of the euro itself is looking ever more possible.

Awesome.