Showing posts with label trade. Show all posts
Showing posts with label trade. Show all posts

Thursday, October 02, 2014

and Democrats lose the Senate

What fuckers.

As Fed Retreats From Stimulus, Central Banks Overseas Expand Theirs by BINYAMIN APPELBAUM, JACK EWING and NEIL GOUGH
WASHINGTON — As the growth of the United States economy outstrips the rest of the developed world, American policy makers are allowing Europe, Japan and even China to seek a little more prosperity — at the expense of Americans.

The Obama administration and the Federal Reserve have watched quietly in recent years as foreign governments and central banks have chipped away at the dollar value of their currencies, strengthening their export industries in the hope of stimulating their economies.

The trend is likely to intensify over the next year as the Fed retreats from its own stimulus campaign while the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan expand their efforts. Mario Draghi, the head of the European Central Bank, said on Thursday that it would begin a new round of bond purchases this month.

The United States has long argued that markets should determine the value of currencies and criticized nations that try to manipulate exchange rates. The current silence reflects both the simple reality that the American economy needs less help than the rest of the developed world and the judgment of officials that the United States would benefit greatly from stronger global growth. That, they say, would be true even if, in the short term, it makes the country’s goods a little harder to sell and jobs a little harder to find.

You’re seeing American officials turn a blind eye to Mario Draghi talking down the euro, and turn a blind eye to interventions by the Chinese, because in both cases they’re making the judgment that having a stabilized situation and decent growth prospects in these countries is far more important,” said Adam Posen, president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “I tend to agree with that.”

American leaders have embraced and celebrated a strong dollar as evidence of a strong economy. It lets Americans buy more foreign goods and borrow more cheaply from foreign countries. It also may draw foreign investors to American financial markets, supporting the rise of asset prices.

But the rise of the dollar carries large risks, too. It makes it harder for American companies to sell goods and services. It may be contributing to the sluggish pace of domestic inflation. And some economists warn that letting the dollar rise is not a sustainable method of encouraging growth.

“A strong dollar, fueled by higher U.S. interest rates, will likely expose vulnerabilities in other parts of the world,” Stephen King, chief global economist at HSBC, wrote in a research note on Thursday. “Latin American countries already flirting with recession would certainly not welcome a tightening of U.S. monetary conditions.” Some economists said the United States should seek to limit the dollar’s rise through diplomacy and policy, and that the Fed should seek to limit its divergence from other central banks by extending its stimulus campaign.

A recent report by the Bank for International Settlements, essentially the bank for central banks, also questioned the global benefits of a stronger dollar, predicting it would tighten financial conditions because foreign banks rely heavily on dollar funding.

Continue reading the main story

But Stephen Cecchetti, a professor at Brandeis University, said the world had a strong interest in Europe’s health. “It’s going to create some instability, but the alternative is worse,” said Mr. Cecchetti, former chief economist of the Bank for International Settlements. “You don’t want to be around if there’s a real depression in Europe.”

The central bank still has not fully deployed the arsenal of a modern central bank to improve growth in Europe. It has refrained from the large-scale purchases of government debt undertaken by the Fed, the Bank of Japan and the Bank of England.

But in recent months it has sought to push down the value of the euro through a variety of measures. In September, the central bank offered loans that were practically interest-free to commercial banks that promised to lend the money to businesses and consumers.

On Thursday, after a board meeting Naples, Italy, the central bank outlined a two-year plan to buy private sector assets, including bank loans packaged into securities. “These purchases will have a sizable impact,” Mr. Draghi said at a news conference after the meeting.

One euro, which bought $1.39 in April, bought only $1.26 at the end of September. “We needed to bring the euro down and we still need to bring the euro down,” Christian Noyer, a central bank board member from France, said in a recent interview with the French broadcaster Radio 1.

While such efforts are usually aimed at increasing exports, the central bank is focused on imports, too. A weaker euro raises the price of imported fuel and other products, which could help budge inflation. Prices in the eurozone last month increased at an annualized rate of just 0.3 percent, far below the 2 percent pace the central bank and other major central banks in the developed world regard as best for sustainable growth.

“This is a currency war where stealing inflation rather than growth is the goal,” economists at the British bank HSBC wrote in a report published on Wednesday. The question, they said, “is whether the U.S. economy can generate sufficient inflation internally to tolerate the deflationary impact of a stronger dollar.”

So far, American officials primarily seem frustrated that the European Central Bank continues to act slowly. James Bullard, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, last year became the rare official to call publicly for stronger action when he told an audience in Frankfurt that the central bank should buy government bonds.

Another question is whether the programs will provide a sufficient jolt. A similar lending program started by the Bank of England in 2012 has not reversed the decline in small-business lending in that country.

“Nobody’s hiring, nobody’s investing, nobody’s spending,” said Stefano Micossi, the director general of Assonime, an Italian business group. “There is no demand for credit. The system is not constrained by the funding side. The banks are awash in liquidity.”

Japan, which has been grappling with the problems confronting Europe for more than two decades, is also seeking growth through currency moves. Under the “Abenomics” stimulus campaign that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe began in early 2013, the Bank of Japan has agreed to double the money supply, and the price of yen in dollars has dropped by about 24 percent.

The results have not met expectations. Japan’s trade deficit has increased while inflation remains weak. The Japanese economy shrank by 7.1 percent in the second quarter after a sales tax increase.

The country’s struggles may show the limits of devaluation, according to Mr. Posen of the Peterson Institute. He noted that demand was less sensitive to small changes in price for the kinds of high-end goods that dominate the exports of Japan and other developed countries.

The government remains publicly committed to its stimulus campaign. But some analysts see signs of tension between the head of the bank, Haruhiko Kuroda, and politicians who are wary that the rise in import prices will provoke consumer resistance.

“Kuroda is much more powerful than other board members for sure, but not necessarily than politicians,” said Hiromichi Shirakawa, Japan economist at Credit Suisse in Tokyo and a former central bank official. “This is scary as the markets have been expecting additional easing by the bank within a couple of months.”

China’s economic rise was built on the suppression of its currency to support cheap exports at the expense of domestic consumption. Then, beginning in 2010, China let the renminbi rise about 20 percent against the dollar as part of its effort to encourage a transition away from export-led growth. But this year, with the economy growing at the slowest pace in more than a decade, China once again pressed down on the renminbi. Its value has fallen about 2 percent against the dollar so far this year.

“It was a way to stimulate the economy without resorting to full blown credit and investment-driven stimulus,” said Diana Choyleva, the head of macroeconomic research at Lombard Street Research in London.

While that small change has prompted little criticism from the United States, the looming question is whether China will continue.

During the financial crisis, China’s government-controlled banking system pumped money into the economy, doubling its assets over a five-year period. Many companies and local governments are now struggling to repay those debts, and authorities are reluctant to treat the pain with another major burst of lending.

Yu Yongding, a senior fellow of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing and a former member of the central bank’s monetary policy committee, said it was imperative for the P.B.O.C. not to blink.

“China needs to adjust its economic structure urgently,” Mr. Yu said. “The combination of the high leverage ratio, high financing costs and low profitability is a serious threat to China’s financial stability.”

But Mr. Yu said the bank might be required to take new steps if the outlook darkened. Andrew Colquhoun, head of Asia-Pacific sovereign ratings at Fitch in Hong Kong, said further devaluation had obvious attractions. Noting the appreciation of the currency since 2010, Mr. Colquhoun said, “The authorities might think they could give some of that back through the renminbi in the event consumption faltered.”

Friday, August 15, 2014

strange defeat of fair trade and sound finance

I pretty much agree with DeLong and Krugman on most things.. But DeLong's defense of NAFTA has returned memories of how Krugman used to argue for free trade in the late 90s as the left protested NAFTA and the the Battle in Seattle had riots over a WTO meeting, which began the militarization of the police.

In the discussion of Piketty a main focus is the aggregate of capital and labor income share. Larry Summers suggest free trade is in the process of working itself out. Dean Baker, another great teacher and populizer like DeLong and Krugman, has suggested the same in regards to China.

But there has been a long run of the working out. Now, both DeLong and Krugman say the U.S. could lower its trade deficit by devaluing the currency but don't emphasize it the way Baker does.

J.W. Mason has been focused on the euthanasia of the rentier and that's another matter of debate under Piketty's K21. It's part of the process of what's being worked out as Summers put it. But with rising inequality, the 1 percent gain in political power and can keep the their returns up.

DeLong and Krugman mistankenly focused on "sound finance" sort of. Krugman on how the Bush tax cuts and deficits would drive up rates. DeLong on Clinton's deal with Greenspan. But both were the pushed to the left by the Bush years, the housing bubble/financial crisis and the Insane Clown Posse Show/ Dark Age of Economics. To be reality-based is to be radical.


Tuesday, July 22, 2014

trade deficit

Dean Baker: 
The $500 billion trade deficit, coupled with a standard multiplier of 1.5, translates into $750 billion of lost annual output (roughly 4.5 percent of GDP). This in turn would come to about 6 million jobs. That is close to enough to get us back to full employment. That would give workers enough bargaining power to secure real wages. So yes, trade is a big deal.
Investment in Equipment (and Software): What Are Neil Irwin and Tyler Cowen Thinking? Tuesday Focus: July 22, 2014 by DeLong


Sunday, May 18, 2014

trade and currency policy

DeLong:
Ryan Avent: Secular Stagnation: Glut Busters: “A particular view about the macroeconomics of the pre-crisis period seems to be coalescing…. Since we haven’t solved the underlying savings glut, the American economy now has three options, according to this view: 1. Suffer through the same low growth (“secular stagnation”) that was characteristic of the early 2000s. 2. Use monetary policy to raise demand through higher asset prices and credit growth, restoring decent growth but creating a risk of new bubbles. 3. Use deficit-financed fiscal policy to absorb excess savings and boost demand, without relying on rapid growth in private credit. Certainly, parts of this story are correct. But is this really the best way to describe what was taking place?… One might… argue that the problem in the 2000s was not that the Fed haplessly created a bubble in order get the economy going again…. The problem was that it… ought to have done… was intervene aggressively in foreign-exchange markets to dampen the dollar’s rapid appreciation…. Doug Campbell… [and] Ju Hyun Pyun…. Now obviously, direct intervention in foreign-exchange markets is not the sort of thing America is supposed to do…. But this is a taboo that needs rethinking. Depreciations have historically been the most effective way to lift expectations for growth and inflation…. The Fed will not do any of the above autonomously. The decision to change the global monetary system will be political, just as it was in 1933 and in 1971, when American presidents made the necessary policy shift. Such decisions only tend to be made when the status quo is clearly untenable or when large political majorities demand a different course. Unfortunately, America’s secular stagnation mess does not seem likely to test either limit for some time to come.”

Wednesday, May 07, 2014

secstags and trade


Back in the Old Days, Rich Countries Were Supposed to Run Trade Surpluses by Dean Baker
Paul Krugman outlines his story of secular stagnation in a blogpost this morning. The odd part of the story is that the trade deficit is nowhere in sight. The punchline is that a slower rate of labor force growth should lead to a reduction in demand. The simple arithmetic is that if the rate of labor force growth slows by 1.0 percentage point, then this would be expected to reduce investment by 3.0 percentage points of GDP. 
This is a story of a demand gap that could be hard to fill, but how does that compare to a trade deficit that peaked at just shy of 6.0 percent of GDP in 2005 and is still close to 3.0 percent of GDP today? Why are we not supposed to be worried about this cause of a shortfall in demand? 
Back in the days before the United States began running persistent trade deficits, the standard theory held that rich countries like the United States should be running trade surpluses. The argument was that capital was plentiful in rich countries, therefore they should be exporting it to poor countries where capital is scarce. This would lead to both a better return on capital and also allow developing countries to grow more rapidly. 
We have seen the opposite story in the United States, especially after the run-up in the dollar following the East Asian financial crisis. This has contributed in a big way to the "secular stagnation" problem, but for some reason there continues to be a reluctance to talk about it. (No, being the reserve currency does not mean we have to run a trade deficit.)

Sunday, March 09, 2014

trade deficit

Baker unlike Krugman and others emphasizes the trade deficit.



In the Real World the Trade Deficit Is More Important Than the Budget Deficit by Dean Baker

Thursday, November 07, 2013

Friday, September 27, 2013

Germany: work sharing and weak currency

Angela Merkle's approval ratings are around 80 percent while Obama's are dropping. Merkel's party won a rare clear majority in the German parliament. Germany's unemployment is around 5 percent while the U.S.'s is at 7.3 percent and the civilian-employment ratio hasn't recovered from the crisis. The surplus countries need to help out the deficit countries with closing their output gaps and achieving full employment. Granted the U.S. would be at Germany's unemployment level with a fiscal policy that was at the same level as the early 2000s recovery.

Germany As Currency Manipulator by Krugman
A correspondent — whose email and name I have lost! — makes a good point. In talking about trade and secular stagnation, I described Germany, with its huge surpluses, as not a currency manipulator. As the correspondent said, however, the euro can be seen as a de facto foreign exchange intervention to keep the de facto Deutsche mark weak. Before 2008, the euro encouraged private capital outflows from Germany to the periphery. Since then, both official rescue packages and also lending among national central banks in the euro area can be seen as taking the place of these private flows. The interbank portion is shown in this chart from Pimco:  


The general point is that if we imagine a euro breakup, I think everyone would agree that the new mark would soar in value, making German manufacturing much less competitive. The German public imagines that it is being cruelly exploited for the benefit of lazy southerners; arguably, what’s really happening is more like China’s purchases of dollars, which are intended not to subsidize America but to boost industry.

Wednesday, September 25, 2013

Secular Stagnation

Trade and Secular Stagnation by Krugman

Krugman on Bubbles and Secular Stagnation by Dean Baker

Bubbles, Regulation, and Secular Stagnation by Krugman
But it is, I think worthwhile – or at any rate soothing – to think about the longer-term future for monetary and fiscal policy. I recently talked about some of these issues with Adair Turner, and I thought I might write up my version of the story so far (just to be clear, Adair bears no responsibility for any errors or confusion in what follows). In brief, there is a case for believing that the problem of maintaining adequate aggregate demand is going to be very persistent – that we may face something like the “secular stagnation” many economists feared after World War II.
Yes. Paul Samuelson and most economists expect the economy to tank after WWII. Instead we had the Golden Age of upper mobility American social democracy and the creation of the middle class and a consumer society.

Part of it was inflation as Krugman knows.
This meant that monetary policy could no longer do the job of stabilizing the economy: Central banks found themselves up against the zero lower bound. Fiscal policy could and should have helped, and automatic stabilizers did help mitigate the slump. But fiscal discourse went completely off the rails, and overall we had unprecedented austerity when we should have had stimulus.
They could target a higher rate of inflation and signal an NGDP level target and do more QE. The problem is political in that the creditors would push back. Of course it would be better if there was fiscal stimulus with aid to the states, etc. and work sharing etc. Deficit problems? Tax the excess leverage in the financial sector.
Our current episode of deleveraging will eventually end, which will shift the IS curve back to the right. But if we have effective financial regulation, as we should, it won’t shift all the way back to where it was before the crisis. Or to put it in plainer English, during the good old days demand was supported by an ever-growing burden of private debt, which we neither can nor should expect to resume; as a result, demand is going to be lower even once the crisis fades.

And here’s the worrisome thing: what if it turns out that we need ever-growing debt to stay out of a liquidity trap? What if the economy looks like Figure 4 even after deleveraging is over? Then what?

This is not a new fear: worries about secular stagnation, about a persistent shortfall of demand even at low interest rates, were very widespread just after World War II. At the time, those fears proved unfounded. But they weren’t irrational, and second time could be the charm.
Depends on fiscal and currency policy which could be changed. Even monetary policy could be changed.