Note to self:
Good think tanks or "centers:"
Center for Budget and Policy Priorities
Center for Budget and Policy Priorities
Center for Economic and Policy Research
Since adjusting currencies are an essential part of a "free-trade" regime, a real trade deal should have rules against currency management. While the exact provisions are more than I have time for just now, Fred Bergsten (the president emeritus of the Peterson Institute for International Economics) and his colleague Joe Gagnon give us a good start here.
I don’t understand the political economy that has brought us tight fiscal & easy money--it simply isn’t creating enough winners to be sustainable...
Rising asset values certainly have created a block of beneficiaries.... But... with gilt yields at around 0.5%... years of saving isn’t worth as much as they hoped... [and] owning a more valuable house will [not] be seen as adequate.... This cohort will get bigger each year....Whilst the macroeconomic argument for more active fiscal policy has always been strong, the political economy conditions that may drive it are becoming clearer. Aggressive deficit-financed state spending may (unusually) create two sets of winners--the workforce who benefit from faster growth, tighter labour markets and stronger real income growth and the mass of (relatively) small scale rentiers who would benefit from higher rates.... [But the] voting public don’t seem particularly keen on deficits. I’ve wondered myself recently--whatever happened to deficit bias? It may be that, as Eric Longeran has argued, this is the best argument for helicopter money. If fiscal policy makers won’t do what is required, then perhaps monetary policymakers can.
Now, I’m not saying that we shouldn’t try. I’d argue, in particular, for substantially more infrastructure spending than Mrs. Clinton is currently proposing, and more borrowing to pay for it. This might significantly boost growth....
Economic anxiety can make voters more prone to racial resentment...
It is, of course, an old trope in social thinking that economic pressure makes it easier to wind masses up against a scapegoated group perceived as “other”. Conversely, times of widespread and rising prosperity are good for liberalism and tolerance. Brad DeLong is quite right that this is a good time to pick up Ben Friedman’s prescient pre-crisis work on the moral consequences of economic growth....
Racial status anxiety and economic anxiety can be one and the same phenomenon, insofar as the economic pressure is perceived as affecting a particular social group. Much is said, all correct, about how the American white working class, and Trump supporters in particular, are well off compared with minorities and the real poor. But over the past generation, the trajectory of the white working class has no doubt changed the most for the worse, compared with the previous generation.
That is true in material, indeed plain physical, terms: while black mortality rates remain higher than those of whites, it’s only for the white working class that the secular mortality decline has gone into reverse. And it is surely true that, as a result, the relative social status of working-class whites has fallen noticeably. That reflects a sharpening of class difference with widening inequality and an unequivocally welcome reduction in racial status difference.
All told, that is a story of tremendous progress. But there is no need to dismiss the economic roots of the racial backlash we now see...
There is lot of interest in Jeremy Corbyn here. Most of the nonsensical British media coverage has not impacted on ordinary Americans and they see him as a progressive insurgent on the Sanders model with Sanders uncanny ability to enthuse idealistic young people. Sanders’ program, with priorities like a higher minimum wage, government health care, breaking up big banks and rebuilding infrastructure, is also very similar to the current Labour leadership.
a moribund but still institutionally powerful neoliberal order that uses its accumulated power to compensate for its complete lack of compelling answers to contemporary political questions.Corey Robin on the Clinton forces:
The Clinton forces want nothing more than to make all of American politics—not just in this election but for the foreseeable future—into a battle between a racist, ethno-nationalist right and a multicultural, neoliberal center. Our job is to make politics into a struggle between a multicultural neoliberal center and a multicultural, multiracial socialist left.
And the risk of high inflation in the UK is zero. People are in a panic over this vote sort of like those poor people that heard a firecracker in the NYC's subway this week. I'm not saying there will not be self inflicted wounds that follow this vote but the vote itself does not mean that much. Stupid trade protection would be a bad thing but it is odd that a lot of people who are off in this panic attack lauded protectionism here. Go figure.
Finding examples of how companies use financial engineering—instead of the realengineer—to bolster their balance sheets is like shooting fish in a barrel. The latest involves the biggest deal of the moment: Microsoft’s acquisition of LinkedIn.
One of the reasons that LinkedIn many have wanted to be acquired, as Andrew Ross Sorkin explained in yesterday’s New York Times, is that it has been using a rather deceptive method of accounting that allows employee compensation paid in stock to be ignored as an expense. That makes for a bottom line that looks better than it really is. (This is especially true given that the amount of stock based-comp paid out by the company in the last two years was nearly equal to operating revenue, according to an analyst source.)
LinkedIn isn’t alone in this sort of crafty accounting–most companies in the S&P now do it. (This piece is a great primer on how the funny math works.) But recently, Facebook started including stock comp in its reporting, and there’s a big push within corporate governance circles to get more companies to do that in order to get back to a more realistic version of earnings. After all, employee compensation, whether paid in cash or stock, is obviously an expense that should go on the balance sheet.
It’s worth understanding just why, and how, stock-based compensation became such a huge deal to begin with. It marked a turning point toward short-term decision-making in corporate America. Key legislative changes that fueled the trend happened under Democratic president Bill Clinton, whose administration passed a 1993 provision on corporate pay. The measure limited corporate tax deductions for regular salaried income to $1 million but exempted “performance-related” pay above and beyond that—pay that was typically awarded in stock options. Joseph Stiglitz, a former head of Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers, remembers this move as “one of the worst things that the Clinton administration did.”
That’s because it created a tremendous incentive for companies to pay more compensation in options. This further fed the cycle of short-termism since executives would from then on be focused primarily on boosting stock prices, by any means necessary. As Stiglitz puts it, “It just opened up this huge span of bonus pay which was not for performance. I had written a lot about this before, that it was largely phony. I argued very strongly during the nineties that the whole stock option pay trend caused a lot of incentives for non-transparency, and that it was directly responsible for what I call creative accounting.” It allowed firms not just to deceive the market but also to avoid paying the taxes that they should have paid.
Why does this matter so much now? Because it contributes to growing inequality and a lackluster economic recovery, by putting more and more tax-free compensation into the hands of the wealthy (who tend not to spend it after a certain point, which is a problem in an economy based mostly on consumer spending). What’s more, says Stiglitz, the performance exception didn’t really reward “performance” as much as any number of other factors, such as monetary policy that boosted stock prices. “If you’re really talking about performance, you should not get higher pay when your stock price goes up because the interest rate goes down,” he explains. “I mean, maybe Janet Yellen should get higher pay for that, but CEOs certainly shouldn’t.” He wrote in his searing memoir of the time, The Roaring Nineties, that “as the Clinton years came to a close, I wondered: What message had we in the end sent through the changes that had been brought about in our taxes?”
The Microsoft-LinkedIn deal brings all this to the fore once again. It’s a topic the next president should tackle head on, no matter the party.
Thee astonishing political emergence of Jeremy Corbyn, the left-wing leader of the British Labour Party, is the sort of thing that passes for normal in Western democracies these days. Since the economic crash in 2008, anti-establishment types have cropped up everywhere. Corbyn, a sixty-six-year-old socialist, had never held a position of authority in his party or in government before being elected last summer on a platform of benign economic populism. He is Syriza in Greece; he is Podemos in Spain; he is Sanders in America. His politics rebel against a Britain that is eager to join foreign wars and pallid in the face of social inequality. “There has to be some kind of a reckoning,” Corbyn told me recently. “You actually have to run an economy for the benefit of people, not run for the benefit of hedge-fund managers.”
...
McDonnell was Corbyn’s campaign manager last summer and is now the shadow Chancellor. (In British politics, the opposition creates a “shadow” cabinet to respond to the Government.) When I asked him if he could convey just how improbable it was that he and Corbyn were now in charge of Labour, McDonnell quoted Fredric Jameson, an American literary theorist and Marxist scholar. “It is easier for people to imagine the end of the earth than it is to imagine the end of capitalism,” he said. “And that is what we are about, aren’t we?”
Economic platitudes about how trade is always worthwhile as long as the winners can compensate the losers are an insult in the age of inequality, where the winners increasingly use their political power to claim ever more winnings.
If we don’t deal with these costs by creating real, substantive, remunerative opportunities for those hurt by trade, some demagogue is sure to come along Trumpeting a case for xenophobia, walls, tariffs and protectionism. If he’s not … um … here already.
The Progressive Era was one of general prosperity after the Panic of 1893—a severe depression—ended in 1897. The Panic of 1907 was short and mostly affected financiers. However, Campbell (2005) stresses the weak points of the economy in 1907–1914, linking them to public demands for more Progressive interventions. The Panic of 1907 was followed by a small decline in real wages and increased unemployment, with both trends continuing until World War I. Campbell emphasizes the resulting stress on public finance and the impact on the Wilson administration's policies. The weakened economy and persistent federal deficits led to changes in fiscal policy, including the imposition of federal income taxes on businesses and individuals and the creation of the Federal Reserve System.[80] Government agencies were also transformed in an effort to improve administrative efficiency.[81]
In the Gilded Age (late 19th century) the parties were reluctant to involve the federal government too heavily in the private sector, except in the area of railroads and tariffs. In general, they accepted the concept of laissez-faire, a doctrine opposing government interference in the economy except to maintain law and order. This attitude started to change during the depression of the 1890s when small business, farm, and labor movements began asking the government to intercede on their behalf.[81]
By the start of the 20th century, a middle class had developed that was leery of both the business elite and the radical political movements of farmers and laborers in the Midwest and West.
When Bernie Sanders started gaining in the polls, it was easy to place him in a long line of idealistic insurgents like Barack Obama, Howard Dean, Bill Bradley or Jerry Brown.
They built strong bases of support among white liberal voters, excelling in places like Boulder, Colo., and Vermont, but their chances of being nominated hinged on building a broader coalition that included nonwhite voters. Only Mr. Obama managed it.
Mr. Sanders, despite his success in Indiana this week, has effectively lost the Democratic nomination, and for a familiar reason: He didn’t do well enough among black voters. But he gained the enthusiasm of a subtly different — and potentially larger — coalition than his liberal predecessors.
His brand of progressivism played far better among white working-class voters than that of past liberal outsiders. At the same time, he fared far worse among the affluent Democrats who represented the core of Mr. Obama and Mr. Bradley’s coalitions.
Mr. Sanders’s weakness among affluent Democrats and his strength among working-class Democrats might seem unsurprising, given his class-focused message. Mr. Sanders himself anticipated it in an interview with The Upshot in July.
But in broader historical terms, it might be something of a turning point in Democratic politics: the moment when the party’s left no longer needs an alliance with wealthy liberals to compete in national elections.
Connecticut, which held its primary April 26, vividly illustrates the huge difference between Mr. Sanders’s coalition and that of past liberal challengers.
In 2000, a flagging Mr. Bradley lost the state by 13 percentage points to Al Gore. He lost badly among nonwhite voters — losing cities like Bridgeport and Hartford by more than 40 points. He lost by more modest margins in the rural, white, working-class eastern part of the state. But he won many of the state’s affluent areas — like Greenwich and New Canaan, along with much of the traditionally liberal western and northwestern part of the state near the border with New York and Massachusetts.
Mr. Obama won almost all of the same areas in 2008, but then added strong support from nonwhite voters — enough to give him a narrow victory over Mrs. Clinton in the state. He won places like Bridgeport and Hartford, even as he fared similarly to Mr. Bradley in places like Greenwich and New Canaan. He fared little or no better in the white, working-class parts of eastern and central Connecticut.
The Sanders-Clinton race reversed this map. Mrs. Clinton lost almost all of the white, working-class areas of rural eastern Connecticut to Mr. Sanders, even though she had won most of it in 2008, as Mr. Gore had in 2000. But she beat Mr. Sanders by huge margins in the affluent parts of western Connecticut where Mr. Obama and Mr. Bradley fared well. She won back the nonwhite voters she lost to Obama in 2008, giving her wins in Bridgeport and Hartford that nearly matched Mr. Gore’s victory in 2000. It was enough for a clear if modest 5.4-point victory.
It’s a pattern that has repeated itself across the country. Mr. Sanders was routed in the wealthy, liberal parts of New York where recent progressive heroes such as Bill de Blasio or Zephyr Teachout fared well — like the Upper West Side, Greenwich Village and parts of Brooklyn.
In Massachusetts, Mr. Sanders lost the affluent, liberal voters in the Boston area, and he might well lose the Bay Area, another enclave of the wealthy and liberal.
This is the first time since 1992 that there’s been a real split between the progressive left and affluent liberals in a Democratic primary. In that race, an iconoclastic outsider, Mr. Brown, excelled among liberals in places like Ann Arbor, Mich., with a progressive message (including opposition to trade agreements), while a more technocratic candidate, Paul Tsongas, won in wealthy liberal areas like Montgomery County, Md., which includes many suburbs northwest of Washington. Bill Clinton easily prevailed over a divided left-liberal wing of the party with strong support among working-class white Democrats and black voters.
Why did affluent liberals support Mrs. Clinton?
One possibility is simple class politics: Mr. Sanders’s class-oriented message didn’t resonate among this group. If true, a candidate of the progressive left would struggle to reunite the left-liberal coalition against an establishment challenger in future Democratic primaries.
But the left might have a better opportunity to reassemble the left-liberal coalition with a different progressive candidate if the problem were Mr. Sanders, not his views. (Anecdotally, I run into a lot of Hillary Clinton supporters who supported Mr. Obama in 2008 and say they would have supported Elizabeth Warren, who’s more technocratic and policy-focused than Mr. Sanders.)
Equally important to the future of progressives in the Democratic Party is Mr. Sanders’s strength in the white working-class areas where Mr. Bradley, Mr. Obama, and both Mr. Brown and Mr. Tsongas faltered. It was Mr. Sanders’s strength among these voters that let him stay fairly competitive, even though he lost half of the traditional left-liberal coalition.
Mr. Sanders won white voters without a college degree by a double-digit margin in Connecticut, as he did in Maryland, Wisconsin, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Illinois, Oklahoma, Indiana, Vermont and Michigan. He probably did so in Rhode Island as well (no exit polls were conducted there).
Outside the South, Mrs. Clinton probably won white voters without a college degree only in Ohio (the exit polls there show she prevailed with that group by one point).
One possible explanation, again, is policy. Income inequality has become a vastly more important issue to Democrats since the Great Recession, and it’s reasonable to assume that white working-class Democrats might be especially drawn to the issue. This is the best case for the progressive left; it would mean that a future progressive populist could count on similar levels of support with a strong, class-oriented message.
The evidence for this view is somewhat mixed. According a compilation of exit polls, around 40 percent of white voters without a college degree wanted more liberal policies than those of Mr. Obama, and Mr. Sanders won these voters handily. The highest number was in Vermont, where 46 percent of white voters without a degree wanted more liberal policies than Mr. Obama’s.
That’s a big bloc that progressives can count on in the future, but it’s not a majority and it’s less than Mr. Sanders’s share of white voters without a degree. That’s in part because Mr. Sanders also won among those white working-class voters who wanted less liberal policies than those of Mr. Obama, a fact that makes Mr. Sanders look as much like a protest vote against Mrs. Clinton as the harbinger of a new Democratic socialism.
But it is nonetheless striking that so many white Democrats without a degree wanted more liberal policies than Mr. Obama’s. In fact, white voters without a college degree were often more likely than either college-educated white voters or minorities to support more liberal policies.
That’s consistent with the notion that white working-class Democrats really have become more receptive to a progressive candidate over the last decade, in some cases even going from being the principal impediment to a left-liberal coalition to the strongest bloc in favor of a more progressive agenda.
According to exit poll data, liberals represented a majority of white Democrats without a college degree in nearly every primary contest. It’s a huge change from just a decade or two ago, when so many white working-class Democrats were conservative (check out this 1995 Pew Research typology of voters if you want to see what the Democratic base used to look like). Mrs. Clinton tended to win “moderate” white voters without college degrees in these states, but she lost among the self-described liberals.
A lot of this is a generational divide. Mrs. Clinton won among white voters without a college degree who were over age 30, but she was pummeled among those who were younger.
Whether Mrs. Clinton was so weak among young white voters because of her weaknesses or the appeal of Mr. Sanders’s policy message will probably decide whether the “Sanders Coalition” can be replicated in a future Democratic primary.
The exit polls, again, send a mixed message. Around half of young white voters didn’t think that Mrs. Clinton was liberal enough, or they wanted policies that were more liberal than Mr. Obama’s. But Mr. Sanders also won among those younger voters who thought Mrs. Clinton and Mr. Obama were liberal enough; her weakness might have had as much (or more) to do with questions about ethical governance as about policy.
Either way, Mr. Sanders’s success — in spite of weakness among wealthy Democrats — is important. There hasn’t been a viable candidate of the progressive left in a Democratic primary in a long time.
Elite Democrats in places like Manhattan; Cambridge, Mass.; and Santa Monica, Calif., have been anchors of liberal politics in the United States for decades. The ability to build a robust progressive coalition without these voters — or their donations — is a new phenomenon, and it could free candidates to pursue progressive policies in future Democratic primaries, and win.
The Democratic Party has moved far enough to the left where it’s possible to imagine a candidate of the progressive left cobbling together a majority without much support from affluent liberals. It isn’t easy — Democrats are basically satisfied with Mrs. Clinton and Mr. Obama’s positions — but it’s possible.
This fact has largely been missing from reporting on the issue. For example a Washington Post piece warning of the end of the world if Trump tried to negotiate on the debt, told readers that the government would pay roughly $255 billion this year in interest on the debt. This includes the $113 billion that the Federal Reserve Board will receive and refund back to the Treasury. That leaves a net interest burden of $142 billion, a bit less than 0.8 percent of GDP. By comparison, the interest burden was over 3.0 percent of GDP in the early 1990s.
In January 2009, at the beginning of Obama’s first term, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office issued a 10-year forecast for the U.S. economy, including such indicators as unemployment, gross domestic product, the budget deficit, government debt and interest rates. Here’s a table comparing the CBO’s expectations for the year 2015 to what has actually happened:NGDP forecast to grow 33 percent, actually grew 22 percent.
So what we are seeing already, in this campaign, is, we have received over six million individual campaign contributions. That's a political revolution, you know that? That's unprecedented, I believe, at this point in the campaign, in history. We are seeing...and when you talk about young people, please do not think that these are 23-year-olds or younger. In virtually every primary and caucus process, we have won the votes of people 45 years of age or younger. They're not just kids. And we're seeing, I think, a revitalization of American democracy.
Perhaps we can have a serious discussion of measures like paid family leave, paid vacations, and work sharing, both as measures that are good in their own right, but also have the potential to bring us closer to full employment. If the distinguished economists attacking Friedman’s analysis can stop their fuming and start thinking, perhaps we can go this route.
Here's our path to the nomination
In less than 48 hours, the polls open in five large and delegate-rich states. After everything we’ve overcome together, there’s never been a more important two days for our campaign.
I want to tell you the truth about our job on Tuesday, and it’s something you may not hear a lot about from the corporate media. Our goal on Tuesday is simply this: do well and hold Hillary Clinton’s delegate lead to a minimum.
Because after Tuesday, the map shifts immediately and dramatically in our favor. With every vote cast after Tuesday’s primaries, her lead will only shrink. We will continue to make up delegates, week after week, in state after state, until we capture the lead on June 7th when California, New Jersey, New Mexico, Montana and the Dakotas vote.
That is our path to victory, but we need to [do] well on Tuesday. That’s the first step.
Recently, more radical proposals have surfaced, reflecting a sense of urgency and widespread disappointment with the impact of current monetary policy. Beyond advocating higher minimum wages, some are calling* for “reverse income policies,” with governments imposing across-the-board wage increases on private employers – a move that would drive up prices and defeat deflationary expectations. The fact that economists whose views typically fall nowhere near those of the far left are even thinking about such interventionism shows just how extreme circumstances have become.
I favor all of these proposals, in some form. The details of their implementation would obviously have to vary, depending on each economy’s circumstances. Germany, for example, is in a strong position to implement a reverse income policy, given its huge current-account surplus, though there would undoubtedly be major political barriers. More spending on education, skills upgrading, and infrastructure, however, is a no-brainer almost everywhere, and is politically more feasible.
The Labour Party has an instinctive urge to protect those left behind by the long years of uneven private-debt-fuelled growth and its austerian aftermath. This is good and proper. However, it would be a mistake to waste Labour’s energies on tirades against austerity. If I am right that austerity is a symptom of low investment (and of a government keen to push the inevitable burden on the weaker citizens), Labour should concentrate on policies that will shift idle savings into investment funding, engendering new technologies that produce green, sustainable development and high quality jobs.
Such an economic program will require the creation of a public investment bank that issues its own bonds (to be supported by a non-inflationary Bank of England quantitative easing strategy targeting these bonds), but also a new alliance with enlightened industrialists and parts of the City keen to profit from sustainable recovery. Labour, I believe, will only overcome its infighting, and the toxic media campaign against its leader, by escaping into a Green, investment-led British Renaissance.
Must-Read: I want to endorse this line of thinking from Paul Krugman because I think it is completely right. My initial worries about Sanders-Friedman was that it made promises about where we could get as far as economic growth over the next decade that were very unlikely to be achievable. More important is the Romers' accurate critique that Sanders's plan would not even come close to getting us there even in the unlikely possibility that things do break the way that Sanders-Friedman. And that generates the corollary that is perhaps most important: Sanders's plans look seriously underpowered, and we should be trying to assemble a coalition to do even more than he envisions come 2017...DeLong:
Must-Read: IMHO, Paul Krugman should have had not two but four parting observations:
Kudos, by the way, to the administration-in-waiting for providing this — it will be a joy to argue policy with an administration that provides comprehensible, honest reports, not case studies in how to lie with statistics.
That said, the report is written in such a way as to make it hard to figure out exactly what’s in the plan. This also makes it hard to evaluate the reasonableness of the assumed multipliers....