Political Economy

Japan, the Platinum Coin, the ZLB and central bank independence

This is regarding my earlier post linking to Waldman and Duy.

Andy Harless comments at interfluidity:

“Printing money will always be exactly as inflationary as issuing short-term debt, because short-term government debt and reserves at the Fed will always be near-perfect substitutes” 

Depends on what you mean by “printing money.” We’ve grown up using the phrase figuratively, but the people who started doing so never anticipated that electronic bank reserves would some day bear interest. I suggest we should go back to using the phrase literally, in which case your statement is not true: printing money will be inflationary (assuming we exit the ZLB), more so than issuing short-term debt (and arguably issuing short-term debt will be inflationary only because it reduces the demand for printed money). 

Back in the days before IOR, the Fed would from time to time change reserve requirements. And if the Fed were to raise the reserve requirement and offset this change with an increase in reserves, we would probably not say that the Fed had “printed money,” even though it had done so in the “literally figurative” sense of having created reserves. But imposing a reserve requirement is essentially the same as paying IOR and then taxing it away. These days the Fed can use adjustments in the IOR rate to prevent the need to literally print money, just as it could use reserve requirements in the past (and still, if it chooses). 

I submit that what is actually relevant is the literal printing of money. (Note that platinum coinage, assuming it were to remain in circulation after the ZLB exit, would not constitute net printing of money, because it would be offset by reduced printing of Federal Reserve notes — or else, if it remained on deposit at the Fed, it would be essentially nonexistent from the private sector’s point of view) The Fed has promised to print money under certain circumstances, but it can control those circumstances (at a cost). Creating reserves is potentially inflationary inasmuch as it raises the cost of refraining from printing money and thus raises the chance that the Fed will print money, but it does not constitute printing of money. Issuance of interest-bearing debt is potentially inflationary inasmuch as it reduces the demand for printed money (by raising the opportunity cost of holding it), thus reducing the amount of money that has to be printed to create a given amount of inflation. 

What is critical here is that there is a demand for Federal Reserve notes — a product that the Fed is licensed to provide monopolistically and can therefore choose a point on the demand curve so as to set the price where it wishes. The fact that the Fed also competitively supplies the market for interest-bearing assets is of less importance. Of course the Fed’s monopoly also becomes less important when normally interest-bearing assets become close substitutes for the Fed’s monopoly product (i.e., when we are at the ZLB).

The interest on reserves seems to be the new thing. As Duy wrote quoting Ip:

I disagree. The Fed does not have to sell its bonds, or the $1 trillion coin, to control inflation (though it may do so anyway). It only needs to retain control of interest rates, and that does not depend on the size of its balance sheet.

Ip argues that interest on reserves gives the Fed the power to control interest rates, and consequently the power to control inflation, regardless of the size of the balance sheet. If you follow Ip's analysis through to its logical conclusion, then why should the Treasury issue debt at all?

Krugman chimes in:

 All Our Base Are Belong To Us (Wonkish)

Well, almost all, at least in normal times. 

Via Mark Thoma, I see that Steve Randy Waldman believes that the distinction between monetary base — the stuff only the central bank can create — and short-term debt in general has disappeared, not just for the moment, but permanently. It’s a point of view I hear fairly often, along with the view that in fact there never was a difference. But it’s a view based, I think, on a slip of the tongue. 

What do I mean by that? That people saying these things — you can see it clearly in Waldman’s post — slide much too easily into identifying monetary base with bank reserves. And since bank reserves now pay interest, well, aren’t they just debt? 

But bank reserves are just one component of the monetary base — and in normal times, a trivial component. Here (pdf) is a useful table:

 

Before the crisis, only about 5 percent of the monetary base consisted of bank reserves. The rest was basically currency. 

This meant that the simple textbook description of how an open-market operation increases the money supply — a bank lends out 1-r of its new reserves (with r the reserve ratio), which return to the banking system, leading to another round of lending, and eventually the money supply rises by 1/r times the injection — is deeply misleading. What actually limits the growth in the money supply is the fact that a substantial part of each round of lending leaks out of the banking system, getting added to hoards of green paper bearing the faces of dead presidents. 

And dead presidents, as you may have noticed, don’t pay interest. 

Now, under current conditions that doesn’t matter; dead presidents don’t pay interest, but neither do T-bills, so short term debt and currency form an aggregate (a Hicksian composite commodity, for the serious nerds out there), whose composition doesn’t matter. But interest rates won’t always be zero, and at that point the size of the monetary base — dead presidents plus a sliver of bank reserves that can be converted into dead presidents at will — will matter again. 

It’s true that the Fed could sterilize the impact of a rise in the monetary base by raising the interest rate it pays on reserves, thereby keeping that base from turning into currency. But that’s just another form of borrowing; it doesn’t change the result that under non-liquidity trap conditions, printing money and issuing debt are not, in fact, the same thing.

The last paragraph is where he disagrees with Ip and Waldman and possibly Duy. I take it Krugman is saying that in non-liquidity trap conditions, printing money would be inflationary while issuing debt would not be. I take it that it's another way of saying deficit spending in a liquidity trap isn't inflationary while, deficit spending in non-liquidity trap conditions even if sterilized would still be borrowing and increasing the debt even if it doesn't add to the monetary base and inflation. I think.