Wednesday, January 30, 2013

There’s no such thing as base money anymore by Waldman
But maybe not. Maybe we’ll see the light and enact a basic income scheme or negative income tax brackets. Maybe we’ll restore the dark, and engineer new ways of providing fraudulently loose credit. Either sort of change could bring “full employment” interest rates back above zero.
Do we ever rise from the floor? by Steve Randy Waldman
I’m less sure about the “someday end” thing. The collapse of the “full employment” interest rate below zero strikes me as a secular rather than cyclical development, although good policy or some great reset could change that. Regardless, if and when the Fed does want to raise interest rates, I think that it will not do so by returning to its old ways. A permanent institutional change has occurred, which renders past experience of the scale and composition of the monetary base unreliable.
Secular Development:

The negative unnatural rate of interest

Right now the Fed is buying $85 billion a month in mortgage back securities and long-term treasuries, to reduce their prices and ease credit conditions. They communicated that they will do this for while and they will keep policy accomadative until unemployment levels lower to 6.5 percent or so.
Surprise Q4 GDP Decline's Not Quite As Bad as It Sounds by Yglesias


"The Bird Has Flown" by Noel Murray (AV Club review of "Justified")


Tuesday, January 29, 2013

Semantics and Key Terms


Currency Wars in the Era of Unconventional Monetary Policies by Menzie Chinn

The Fed Doesn't Ever Have To "Unwind" Its Balance Sheet by Yglesias

From my genealogy*

interest rate on excess reserves (IOER)
On October 3, 2008, Section 128 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 allowed the Fed to begin paying interest on excess reserve balances as well as required reserves. They began doing so three days later.[3] Banks had already begun increasing the amount of their money on deposit with the Fed at the beginning of September, up from about $10 billion total at the end of August, 2008, to $880 billion by the end of the second week of January, 2009.[4][5] In comparison, the increase in reserve balances reached only $65 billion after September 11, 2001 before falling back to normal levels within a month. Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson's original bailout proposal under which the government would acquire up to $700 billion worth of mortgage-backed securities contained no provision to begin paying interest on reserve balances.[6]

The day before the change was announced, on October 7, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke expressed some confusion about it, saying, "We're not quite sure what we have to pay in order to get the market rate, which includes some credit risk, up to the target. We're going to experiment with this and try to find what the right spread is."[7] The Fed adjusted the rate on October 22, after the initial rate they set October 6 failed to keep the benchmark U.S. overnight interest rate close to their policy target,[7][8] and again on November 5 for the same reason.[9]

The Congressional Budget Office estimated that payment of interest on reserve balances would cost the American taxpayers about one tenth of the present 0.25% interest rate on $800 billion in deposits:
Estimated Budgetary Effects[10]
Year20062007200820092010201120122013201420152016
Millions of dollars0-192-192-202-212-221-242-253-266-293-308
(Negative numbers represent expenditures; losses in revenue not included.)
0.25% simple interest on $800 billion is $2 billion, not $202 million as shown for 2009. But those expenditures pale in comparison to the lost tax revenues worldwide resulting from decreased economic activity from damage to the short-termcommercial paper and associated credit markets.

Beginning December 18, the Fed directly established interest rates paid on required reserve balances and excess balances instead of specifying them with a formula based on the target federal funds rate.[11][12][13] On January 13, Ben Bernanke said, "In principle, the interest rate the Fed pays on bank reserves should set a floor on the overnight interest rate, as banks should be unwilling to lend reserves at a rate lower than they can receive from the Fed. In practice, the federal funds rate has fallen somewhat below the interest rate on reserves in recent months, reflecting the very high volume of excess reserves, the inexperience of banks with the new regime, and other factors. However, as excess reserves decline, financial conditions normalize, and banks adapt to the new regime, we expect the interest rate paid on reserves to become an effective instrument for controlling the federal funds rate."[14] 
Also on January 13, Financial Week said Mr. Bernanke admitted that a huge increase in banks' excess reserves is stifling the Fed's monetary policy moves and its efforts to revive private sector lending.[15] On January 7, 2009, the Federal Open Market Committee had decided that, "the size of the balance sheet and level of excess reserves would need to be reduced."[16] On January 15, Chicago Fed president and Federal Open Market Committee member Charles Evans said, "once the economy recovers and financial conditions stabilize, the Fed will return to its traditional focus on the federal funds rate. It also will have to scale back the use of emergency lending programs and reduce the size of the balance sheet and level of excess reserves. Some of this scaling back will occur naturally as market conditions improve on account of how these programs have been designed. Still, financial market participants need to be prepared for the eventual dismantling of the facilities that have been put in place during the financial turmoil" [17]At the end of January, 2009, excess reserve balances at the Fed stood at $793 billion[18] but less than two weeks later on February 11, total reserve balances had fallen to $603 billion. On April 1, reserve balances had again increased to $806 billion, and on February 10, 2010, they stood at $1.154 trillion.[19] By August 2011, they had reached $1.6 trillion. 
open market operations (OMO)

hot-potato effect

monetary base

Floor System (from Waldman)
Under the floor system, a central bank sets the monetary base to be much larger than would be consistent with its target interest rate given private-sector demand, but prevents the interbank interest rate from being bid down below its target by paying interest to reserve holders at the target rate. The target rate becomes the “floor”: it never pays to lend base money to third parties at a lower rate, since you’d make more by just holding reserves (converting currency into reserves as necessary). The US Federal Reserve is currently operating under something very close to a floor system. The scale of the monetary base is sufficiently large that the Federal Funds rate would be stuck near zero if the Fed were not paying interest on reserves. In fact, the effective Federal Funds rate is usually between 10 and 20 basis points. With a “perfect” floor, the rate would never fall below 25 bps. But because of institutional quirks (the Fed discriminates, it fails to pay interest to nonbank holders of reserves), the rate falls just a bit below the “floor”.

If “the crisis ends” (whatever that means) and the Fed reverts to its traditional approach to targeting interest rates, Krugman will be right and I will be wrong, the monetary base will revert to something very different than short-term debt. However, I’m willing to bet that the floor system will be with us indefinitely. If so, base money and short-term government debt will continue to be near-perfect substitutes, even after interest rates rise.
------------------------------
* a work in progress

floor system safe asset paradigm shift genealogy*

Oct. 20, 2011

What If We Paid Off The Debt? The Secret Government Report by David Kestenbaum (Planet Money)

Sept. 5, 2012

The Untold Story Of How Clinton's Budget Destroyed The American Economy by Joe Weisenthal

Jan. 2, 2013

Debt in a Time of Zero by Krugman

Jan. 7

On The Folly of Inflation Targeting In A World Of Interest Bearing Money by Ashwin Parameswaran

The end of RoRo, or is it? by Izabella Kaminska

Jan. 8

The liquidity trap heralds fundamental change by Frances Coppola

Jan. 9

Platinomics by Greg Ip

Jan. 12

On The Disruptiveness of the Platinum Coin by Tim Duy

Jan. 13

There’s no such thing as base money anymore by Steve Randy Waldman

A Trap of My Own Making by Tim Duy

Jan. 14

All Our Base Are Belong To Us (Wonkish) by Krugman

Floor Systems by Stephen Williamson

Jan. 15

Do we ever rise from the floor? by Steve Randy Waldman

All Your Base Are Belong To Us, Continued (Still Wonkish) by Krugman

Yet more on the floor with Paul Krugman by Steve Randy Waldman

Money and Debt, Continued by Tim Duy

Do sofas refute monetarism? by Nick Rowe


Jan. 16

Once you turn base money into short-term debt, can you go back? by Izabella Kaminska

Understanding the Permanent Floor—An Important Inconsistency in Neoclassical Monetary Economics by Scott Fullwiler


Jan. 17

All Your Base Are Belong To Us: What Is the Question? by Krugman

All Your Dorks Are Belong to This by Cullen Roche

Krugman, Kaminska, and Waldman by Scott Sumner

Monetary Policy: From Managing the Monetary Base to Setting an Interest Rate Floor by Peter Dorman

Let’s Talk About Interest on Reserves by Josh Hendrickson

Jan. 18

A confederacy of dorks by Steve Randy Waldman

THE PERMANENT FLOOR 2004 by Scott Fullwiler

Two extreme fiscal/monetary worlds by Nick Rowe

AND NICK ROWE IS THE LATEST ECONOMIST TO JOIN THE INARTICULATE DORKS... by Brad DeLong

The Coin is Dead! Long Live the Coin! by Michael Sankowski

Furthering Understanding of the Permanent Floor by Joshua Wojnilower

Shinzo and the Helicopters (Somewhat Wonkish) by Krugman

Jan. 19

Waldman Thinks Bernanke Will Go for (Flawed) Exit #1 by Robert Murphy

Murphy of the bad inflation bet, I think.

Jan. 28

Safe Assets and Financial Crises by Carola Binder
---------------------
*provisional. Times are not sorted. Updated from Jan. 19th posting.

Safe Assets

HOISTED FROM THE ARCHIVES: THE SAFE ASSET SHORTAGE AND THE CURRENT DOWNTURN by DeLong

Safe Assets and Financial Crises by Carola Binder
Mark Thoma has shared a link to a new working paper by Gary Gorton and Guillermo Ordoñez called "The Supply and Demand for Safe Assets." The paper brings to mind a once-confidential document written by economists in the Clinton Administration called "Life After Debt" which was recently made public by the team at NPR's Planet Money. The report notes:
In the year 2000, the U.S. Treasury began actively buying back the public debt; we should all appreciate the tremendous achievement this represents for the Nation as a whole... We must realize however, that a sharp reduction in Federal debt and the possible accumulation of a Federal asset raises at least three important issues. First, investors looking for an asset free of credit risk can no longer count on an abundant supply of U.S. Treasury securities, and Treasury securities may no longer provide a reliable benchmark for other interest rates. Second, the Federal Reserve may have to change the mechanisms by which it conducts monetary policy. Third, continued surpluses after the public debt has been paid off will require the Federal. government to acquire assets; either directly or though the Social Security Trust Fund. This raises issues about what kinds of assets might be acquired, and the best way to manage this task.”
And:
For a time, the AAA-rated top tranches of these manufactured assets were considered really safe, and it was like the "normal times" in the model when lenders trust that on average, collateral quality is good enough that they don't need to pay the extra cost to check on it. But then it became apparent that the average quality was much lower, and these assets became less effective collateral, and the financial crisis began. There are at least some claims that the Clinton surplus kicked off the rise in mortgage-backed securities issuance. (I included two graphs below, made using data from FRED, in case you want to evaluate the claims for yourself.) If you decide to read "The Supply and Demand for Safe Assets," please do also look at Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen's empirical counterpart. Or, for something lighter, listen to Planet Money'sepisode "What If We Paid Off The Debt? The Secret Government Report."





I think I should add Binder's post and Gorton & Ordoñez's working paper to my paradigm shift geneology.


Monday, January 28, 2013

DNWR


The Fed Is More Out of It Than You Thought It Was by Mike Konczal

The Fed's Real Mistake in 2007: Forgetting About Aggregate Demand by Yglesias
Under "normal" conditions, one stabilizing element of the Fed is that people think they know how the Fed will respond to future contingencies. We all know that if core inflation gets up to 3 percent for a couple of quarters in a row, the Fed will respond with tighter money. That means nobody expects that to happen. And the expectation that it won't happen helps prevent it from happening. Everyone's plans are coordinated around a no-high-inflation scenario. And for a long time, that also operated on the downside. But the Fed didn't articulate in advance any clear ideas about the zero bound to reassure people. People knew Ben Bernanke had written some old papers about this. But he wasn't publicly speaking about strategies, and we can see in the transcripts that he wasn't privately trying to build consensus either. It was a failure of contingency planning that exacerbated the problems when the bad contingency arose.
If downward nominal wage rigidity hadn't occurred to extent it did - which surprised Yellen and Krugman - we could have had deflation seeing as how the Fed as slow to react and communicate its intentions.

Sunday, January 27, 2013

Larry Summers Says the Clinton Administration Didn't Have Access to Government Economic Data by Dean Baker
Okay, that is not exactly what he said, but if Chrystia Freeland's account of Summers' comments at Davos is to be believed Summers is badly misinformed about the state of the U.S. economy in 1993, when he was one of the top advisers in the Clinton administration. According to Freeland Summers said: 
"In 1993, here’s what the situation was: Capital costs were really high, the trade deficit was really big, and if you looked at a graph of average wages and the productivity of American workers, those two graphs lay on top of each other. So, bringing down the deficit, reducing capital costs, raising investment, spurring productivity growth, was the right and natural central strategy for spurring growth. That was what Bob Rubin advised Bill Clinton, that was the advice Bill Clinton followed, and they were right." 
This is not what the data say. Here's the story on real wages and productivity.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
 
There are some measurement issues that would reduce the gap somewhat, but anyone who could see these two as laying "on top of each other" needs some new glasses. The sharp divergence between productivity and wages began in the 1980s. It would be really scary if Larry Summers, Robert Rubin and the rest did not know this in 1993. 
The other parts of Summers' story are also wrong. The trade deficit was less than 1.0 percent of GDP in 1993. By comparison it was almost 4.0 percent of GDP when Clinton left office in 2000. The interest rate on ten-year Treasury bonds was 6.6 percent in January of 1993. Coupled with an inflation rate of around 3.0-3.5 percent, this gave a real interest rate in the neighborhood of 3.1-3.6 percent. This is perhaps a bit higher than desirable, but actually not much different than what we saw through most of the Clinton years. 
In short, Summers is describing a history that does not exist. He either has a very poor memory or is just making things up.

Saturday, January 26, 2013

Friday, January 25, 2013

"The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock"

By chance I was thinking about T.S. Eliot's poem recently. Prufrock is paralyzed by his self-awareness. 
Perhaps the most significant dispute lies over the "overwhelming question" that Prufrock is trying to ask. Many believe that Prufrock is trying to tell a woman of his romantic interest in her,[19] pointing to the various images of women's arms and clothing and the final few lines in which Prufrock laments that the mermaids will not sing to him. Others, however, believe that Prufrock is trying to express some deeper philosophical insight or disillusionment with society, but fears rejection, pointing to statements that express a disillusionment with society such as "I have measured out my life with coffee spoons" (line 51). Many believe that the poem is a criticism of Edwardian society and Prufrock's dilemma represents the inability to live a meaningful existence in the modern world.[24] McCoy and Harlan wrote "For many readers in the 1920s, Prufrock seemed to epitomize the frustration and impotence of the modern individual. He seemed to represent thwarted desires and modern disillusionment."*
Coincidently, "30 Rock" - I think - has its finale next Thursday. For many years I wouldn't watch the show, because I had a crush on Fey - who's my age - and one shouldn't encourage that kind of lameass embarrassing thing. Friends at work would want to discuss it and insisted I would like because I have that kind of sense of humor. Eventually I gave in, there isn't much else on TV these days. And yes the show is very funny and right up my alley. Part of what's funny are the very un-selfaware and un-selfconscious characters like Tracy Jordan and Jenna Malone. In last night's show, Liz Lemon adopts 2 children who are kid-versions of the two. Larry David is in some ways un-selfconscious when some rude person transgresses one of his unwritten social rules or guidelines. And Sarah Silverman's character on her show was very un-self-aware. These kinds of people are godsends to the Prufrocks among us.
---------------------
*maybe the question is about politics and philosophy, the deep issues your average middle class American feels they should stay clear of.

Thursday, January 24, 2013


Misinterpreting the history of macroeconomic thought by Simon Wren-Lewis

inequality and growth

I tend to side with Krugman here if I understand the debate correctly.

Inequality and demand by Steve Randy Waldman

Why Don't Rich People Buy More Yachts and Fewer Exotic Financial Products by Yglesias

Guest Post: “The Savings Rate Has Recovered…if You Ignore the Bottom 99%” by Andrew Kaplan, a hedge fund manager ("Naked Capitalism," 8.31.2009)

Why don't we have deflation? Increased debt? Extend and pretend?

(via Mike Sankowski who I confuse with Mark A. Sadowski. It's like with Waldman and Robert Waldmann.)

Optimal Control approach

NGDP level targeting: Yellen it from the rooftops, but nobody heard by Cardiff Garcia

(via Thoma)

Yellen Supports Explicit Guideposts by Tim Duy

I think I'm going to copy Jessica on "New Girl" and set the Pointer Sisters' "I'm So Excited" as my new ringtone.

Wednesday, January 23, 2013

Tuesday, January 22, 2013

Bank of Japan Disappoints With Punt On Higher Inflation Target by Yglesias


There were numerous news stories and columns touting the liberal agenda that President Obama put forward in his second inaugural address yesterday (e.g. here and here). While the speech certainly hit on several issues that have historically been important to liberals, the failure to mention full employment was a major omission.

The fact that the economy is still more than 9 million jobs below its trend growth path implies enormous suffering. Not only are millions of people unnecessarily unemployed or underemployed, high levels of unemployment mean that most workers lack bargaining power. As a result they are unable to raise their wages and get their share of productivity growth. This means that income is likely to continue to be redistributed upward.

There are not easy political paths to full employment at this point. Government stimulus (i.e. larger deficits) is the most obvious path, but that seems out of the question in a context where deficit reduction is dominating the policy debate. If the dollar dropped, it would make U.S. goods more competitive, thereby increasing net exports, but Obama has made little committment in this direction and the process would take time in any case.

The best prospect is probably increased use of worksharing. Germany has used worksharing to lower its unemployment rate by more than 2 percentage points below its pre-recession level, even though its growth has been no better than growth in the United States. Worksharing does enjoy bipartisan support in the United States and is an option in the unemployment insurance systems in 25 states, but the takeup rate has been extremely low. It's possible that a major presidential push could substantially increase the use of worksharing.

Anyhow, it is striking that a speech that touched on many liberal themes did not make a commitment to full employment. This should have been noted in the coverage.

Monday, January 21, 2013

26 & 23 years old

How M.I.T. Ensnared a Hacker, Bucking a Freewheeling Culture
There may have been a reason for the university’s response. According to the timeline, the tech team detected brief activity from China on the netbook — something that occurs all the time but still represents potential trouble.
...
Michael Sussmann, a Washington lawyer and a former federal prosecutor of computer crime, said that M.I.T. was the victim and that, without more information, it had to assume any hackers were “the Chinese, even though it’s a 16-year-old with acne.” Once the police were called in, the university could not back away from the investigation. “After there’s a referral, victims don’t have the opportunity to change their mind.” 
China, oh noes!

A Young Publisher Takes Marx Into the Mainstream
In writing Mr. Sunkara can come on like a one-man insult-comedy squad, whether the target is regular whipping boys like the Washington Post blogger Ezra Klein (“a young liberal with a lust for properly punctuated policy memos”) or the capitalist vampire squid itself. 
But in person he’s more straightforwardly earnest and quick to emphasize that the magazine he founded in his dorm room has evolved into a collective endeavor. Jacobin’s success, he said, springs from the highly cohesive politics of the four co-editors he has recruited and their shared commitment to advancing a critique of liberalism that is free of obscurantist academic theory or “cheap hooks.” 
...
“Seth had a title with nine words and a semicolon,” he recalled. “I crossed it out and wrote ‘Burn the Constitution.’ ” 
That article, along with “Zombie Marx,” a critique of chapter-and-verse Marxist economics by Mike Beggs, a young lecturer in political economy at the University of Sydney who Mr. Sunkara met (like Mr. Ackerman) through the e-mail list of Doug Henwood’s Left Business Observer, got some pickup on blogs. But it was a packed Jacobin-organized panel on the Occupy movement, held in a downtown Manhattan bookstore three weeks after the protests began in Zuccotti Park in September 2011, that really put the magazine on the map, drawing attention from Politico and Glenn Beck.
From Beggs's "Zombie Marx":
Inflation was simply not seen as an independent phenomenon worthy of analysis, as it would become in the 20th century when the gold anchor loosened and dropped away. It was enough to know that the anchor would assert itself eventually. The problem for the state or central bank was not the value of money per se, but the convertibility of particular monies. But in our world of chronic, if low-level, inflation and floating exchange rates, we need different things from our monetary theory. We have no choice but to engage with new questions Marx could not have imagined – and here the reference point should be Keynes and the post-Keynesians.
I think there is a big point in here somewhere. The Left and Marxists have been very dismissive of monetary policy. German Marxists running their government in the 1920s were into the Gold Standard. But if there was no Fed in the 19th century, there were in fact periods of inflation and deflation. William Jennings Bryan's "Cross of Gold" speech was given in 1896.



Inequality and Growth

Inequality Is Holding Back the Recovery by Joseph Stiglitz

Inequality and Recovery by Krugman

Krugman versus Stiglitz on Inequality and Economic Growth by Dean Baker

How Inequality Holds Back Recovery by Yglesias

Sunday, January 20, 2013

"Ben Affleck's intervention not even required."*

In Reversal, House G.O.P. Agrees to Lift Debt Limit
Those conversations led into Thursday morning, when Mr. Boehner and Representative Eric Cantor of Virginia, the No. 2 House Republican, opened the retreat by going through the timeline for the coming budget fights, according to aides who were there. 
They turned the floor over to Representative Dave Camp of Michigan, the House Ways and Means chairman, who delivered a blow-by-blow description of the economic disaster that could be wrought by a government default. Mr. Camp also talked through the notion held by some Republicans that the Treasury Department could manage a debt ceiling breach by channeling the daily in-flow of tax dollars to the most pressing needs, paying government creditors, sending out Social Security checks and financing the military. His message was that it would not work, the aides said.
Jonathan Chait - along with Krugman and Jonathan Cohn - admit they were wrong.
The whole key to making Obama’s extortion-squelching plan, and saving American government from endless cycles of hostage drama that would eventually end in a default, was to credibly insist that he would not trade anything for a debt ceiling hike. After he moved his red line on tax cuts, I doubted that Obama could really make this stick. But he has. 
Now, Republicans are only voting on a three-month extension. But this is a face-saving gesture, too. Once they’ve recognized that the debt ceiling isn’t leverage, they have no reason to keep taking painful votes that expose their members to attack ads. 
Letting Republicans weaponize the debt ceiling in the first place in 2011 was one of the crucial errors of Obama’s presidency. He appears to have corrected it.
-----------------------------
*The Coin of Freedom was sort of a complicated ploy like Affleck's fake movie production in Argo.

Saturday, January 19, 2013

reading the paradigm shift genealogy

I'm currently slowly going through my paradigm shift genealogy timeline, and will add some quotes here to help me digest what they all are discussing. 

1. From Krugman on Jan. 2:
It’s true that printing money isn’t at all inflationary under current conditions— that is, with the economy depressed and interest rates up against the zero lower bound. But eventually these conditions will end. At that point, to prevent a sharp rise in inflation the Fed will want to pull back much of the monetary base it created in response to the crisis, which means selling off the Federal debt it bought. So even though right now that debt is just a claim by one more or less governmental agency on another governmental agency, it will eventually turn into debt held by the public.
2. From Coppola on Jan. 7. Them is referring to Keynes and Krugman.
So for them, the liquidity trap is a phenomenon associated with very low nominal interest rates - an abnormal situation by any standard. And we have had very low nominal rates for five years now, so it would be reasonable to assume that the liquidity trap we now find ourselves in is due to interest rates being near-zero, and that once we have restored the economy to sufficient health to allow interest rates to rise to historic norms, normal service will be resumed. 
But that's not actually the current situation. We have interest-bearing money. Yes, interest rates on money are very low at the moment. And therefore - as I explained above - so are yields on the investments which are near-substitutes for money. But if interest rates were to rise, would this change?

I can't see any reason why it should. Because interest-bearing money is freely exchangeable with government debt - and indeed the shadow banking system constantly performs that intermediation - the equivalence between government debt and interest-bearing money would hold at any level of interest rates. We are indeed in a liquidity trap, but it's not because of economic distress and near-zero interest rates. It is because the nature of money has fundamentally changed. Money is no longer just "cash". Money is any financial asset that flows freely and is readily exchangeable for currency.

3. From Duy on Jan. 12
Ultimately, I don't believe deficit spending should be directly monetized as I believe that Paul Krugman is correct - at some point in the future, the US economy will hopefully exit the zero bound, and at that point cash and government debt will not longer be perfect substitutes. Note that Greg Ip disagreed with this point:
I disagree. The Fed does not have to sell its bonds, or the $1 trillion coin, to control inflation (though it may do so anyway). It only needs to retain control of interest rates, and that does not depend on the size of its balance sheet. 
Ip argues that interest on reserves gives the Fed the power to control interest rates, and consequently the power to control inflation, regardless of the size of the balance sheet. If you follow Ip's analysis through to its logical conclusion, then why should the Treasury issue debt at all? Why not just issue platinum coins? Could cash and government debt combine to serve the same functions together that they serve separately? Consider the disruptiveness of that outcome to the status quo.
 4. Waldman on Jan. 13
What I am fairly sure won’t happen, even if interest rates are positive, is that “cash and government debt will no[] longer be perfect substitutes.” Cash and (short-term) government debt will continue to be near-perfect substitutes because, I expect, the Fed will continue to pay interest on reserves very close to the Federal Funds rate. (I’d be willing to make a Bryan-Caplan-style bet on that.) This represents a huge change from past practice — prior to 2008, the rate of interest paid on reserves was precisely zero, and the spread between the Federal Funds rate and zero was usually several hundred basis points. I believe that the Fed has moved permanently to a “floor” system (ht Aaron Krowne), under which there will always be substantial excess reserves in the banking system, on which interest will always be paid (while the Federal Funds target rate is positive).
5. Duy on Jan. 13
I think what I had in mind is this (and I admit that I am not wed to this, a little open-microphone now): The Fed has a portfolio of bonds which is a indirect transfer from Treasury which in turns allows it to pay interest on reserves. Lacking such a portfolio, the Fed would need to receive a direct transfer from the Treasury to pay interest on reserves. Operationally, these are the same. As long as both have the same objective function, it makes no difference if the Treasury's transfer goes through the middleman of a bond or just directly to the Fed. But what if the Treasury does not have the same objective function, does not want higher interest rates, and thus does not want to transfer the resources to the Fed? What claim does the Fed have on the Treasury to force it to act?  
Somewhere in this space is why we have come to accept the importance of an independent central bank. Indeed, this is a concern should the Fed need to pay interest on reserves that exceed the interest earned on its bond portfolio. Then the Fed would need to turn to the Treasury and say "Remember when we paid you $89 billion? Well, we need some of that back now."    
Ultimately, though, I have to agree with Waldman when I allow for the two authorities to have the same objective function. This is another way of saying that one side effect of the zero bound is the blurring of what many thought were sharp lines between fiscal and monetary authorities.
6. Waldman on Jan. 15
If “the crisis ends” (whatever that means) and the Fed reverts to its traditional approach to targeting interest rates, Krugman will be right and I will be wrong, the monetary base will revert to something very different than short-term debt. However, I’m willing to bet that the floor system will be with us indefinitely. If so, base money and short-term government debt will continue to be near-perfect substitutes, even after interest rates rise. 
Again, there’s no substantive dispute over the economics here. Krugman writes:
"It’s true that the Fed could sterilize the impact of a rise in the monetary base by raising the interest rate it pays on reserves, thereby keeping that base from turning into currency. But that’s just another form of borrowing; it doesn’t change the result that under non-liquidity trap conditions, printing money and issuing debt are not, in fact, the same thing."
If the Fed adopts the floor system permanently, then the Fed will always “sterilize” the impact of a perpetual excess of base money by paying its target interest rate on reserves. As Krugman says, this prevents reserves from being equivalent to currency and amounts to a form of government borrowing. So, we agree: under the floor system, there is little difference between base money and short-term debt, at any targeted interest rate! Printing money and issuing debt are distinct only when there is an opportunity cost to holding base money rather than debt. If Krugman wants to define the existence of such a cost as “non-liquidity trap conditions”, fine. But, if that’s the definition, I expect we’ll be in liquidity trap conditions for a very long time! By Krugman’s definition, a floor system is an eternal liquidity trap.
Am I absolutely certain that the Fed will choose a floor system indefinitely? No. That is a conjecture about future Fed behavior. But, as I’ve said, I’d be willing to bet on it.

Historical case studies

Concerning the new paradigm discussed at my paradigm shift genealogy, what are the historical case studies of the coin option or monetizing the debt.

Krugman mentions Japan's successful policies in the first half of the 1930s:
And beyond that, the credibility of a higher inflation target in the face of the deflationary bias of central bankers may well be best established by (a) reducing the central bank’s autonomy and (b) getting the central bank in the business of supporting — indeed, monetizing — government deficits, at least for a while. Gauti Eggertsson made this point long ago (pdf), pointing to Japan’s successful polices in the first half of the 30s as a clear example. Indeed, Gauti argued that having a large government debt can be a real advantage in such circumstances: efforts to raise expected inflation gain extra credibility if the government would clearly benefit in fiscal terms, and the central bank is sufficiently subordinated to elected officials that investors believe that it will take these fiscal benefits into account.
Tim Duy discusses Bernanke on Japan and helicopter drops.
However, besides possibly inconsistent application of fiscal stimulus, another reason for weak fiscal effects in Japan may be the well-publicized size of the government debt...In addition to making policymakers more reluctant to use expansionary fiscal policies in the first place, Japan's large national debt may dilute the effect of fiscal policies in those instances when they are used....My thesis here is that cooperation between the monetary and fiscal authorities in Japan could help solve the problems that each policymaker faces on its own. Consider for example a tax cut for households and businesses that is explicitly coupled with incremental BOJ purchases of government debt--so that the tax cut is in effect financed by money creation.
Grep Ip brings up the example of the pre-1951 Accord-era of 1942-51.
Yes, the Fed has sacrificed its independence for the sake of the national interest before, such as maintaining a ceiling on Treasury yields between 1942 and 1951; but that was (initially) in wartime, and it eventually led to inflation. Would avoiding the debt ceiling be important enough to compromise the Fed's independence? Perhaps not in this one case; but it would set a precedent future presidents will happily exploit and feed the perception that America’s economic institutions are in terminal decline. America has had debt ceiling crises before (in 1957, 1985, 1996 and 2011) and survived; are the unknown risks of the platinum coin option obviously preferable to the known risks of hitting the debt ceiling?
And mentions New Zealand:
Fed staff have laboured for years on the mechanics of this exit process; they can't be sure how it will transpire, since the Fed has never had to raise interest rates with so much excess reserves in the system. But the experience of other central banks, in particular the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, “suggests that tightening by increasing the interest rate paid on central bank balances can help reduce or eliminate the need to drain balances,” according to a 2010 study by three Fed economists. 
What this means is that while the platinum coin option expands the Fed’s balance sheet and, ultimately, the monetary base, it has no implications for inflation, even if the Treasury never buys back the coin.


Escape velocity and exit strategy



The Japanese Economy: Both Barrels? by Ryan Avent
I think I lean toward Mr Posen's view. Fiscal stimulus is neither necessary or sufficient for Japanese recovery, and though it could enhance a new monetary expansion it also carries some potentially serious risks. But I'm not that confident in the conclusion. Japan is a strange case. I suppose that makes the big upside of the situation (for economists, not the Japanese) the possibility that we'll learn something.
I disagree and agree with Krugman.

Floor System Paradigm Shift Genealogy*

I have an updated list here.

Jan. 2

Debt in a Time of Zero by Krugman

Jan. 7

On The Folly of Inflation Targeting In A World Of Interest Bearing Money by Ashwin Parameswaran

The end of RoRo, or is it? by Izabella Kaminska

Jan. 8

The liquidity trap heralds fundamental change by Frances Coppola

Jan. 9

Platinomics by Greg Ip

Jan. 12

On The Disruptiveness of the Platinum Coin by Tim Duy

Jan. 13

There’s no such thing as base money anymore by Steve Randy Waldman

A Trap of My Own Making by Tim Duy

Jan. 14

All Our Base Are Belong To Us (Wonkish) by Krugman

Floor Systems by Stephen Williamson

Jan. 15

Do we ever rise from the floor? by Steve Randy Waldman

All Your Base Are Belong To Us, Continued (Still Wonkish) by Krugman

Yet more on the floor with Paul Krugman by Steve Randy Waldman

Money and Debt, Continued by Tim Duy

Do sofas refute monetarism? by Nick Rowe


Jan. 16

Once you turn base money into short-term debt, can you go back? by Izabella Kaminska

Understanding the Permanent Floor—An Important Inconsistency in Neoclassical Monetary Economics by Scott Fullwiler


Jan. 17

All Your Base Are Belong To Us: What Is the Question? by Krugman

All Your Dorks Are Belong to This by Cullen Roche

Krugman, Kaminska, and Waldman by Scott Sumner

Monetary Policy: From Managing the Monetary Base to Setting an Interest Rate Floor by Peter Dorman

Let’s Talk About Interest on Reserves by Josh Hendrickson

Jan. 18

A confederacy of dorks by Steve Randy Waldman

THE PERMANENT FLOOR 2004 by Scott Fullwiler

Two extreme fiscal/monetary worlds by Nick Rowe

AND NICK ROWE IS THE LATEST ECONOMIST TO JOIN THE INARTICULATE DORKS... by Brad DeLong

The Coin is Dead! Long Live the Coin! by Michael Sankowski

Furthering Understanding of the Permanent Floor by Joshua Wojnilower

Shinzo and the Helicopters (Somewhat Wonkish) by Krugman

Jan. 19

Waldman Thinks Bernanke Will Go for (Flawed) Exit #1 by Robert Murphy

Murphy of the bad inflation bet, I think.

Jan. 28

Safe Assets and Financial Crises by Carola Binder
19JAN
---------------------
*provisional. Times are not sorted.

Well Ezra Klein doesn't admit that he was wrong - unlike Krugman. This damages his brand in my eyes. We'll see what Yglesias does on Monday. He was already hedging his bets, echoing what Dean Baker said about the Republicans falling into line over TARP.

Financial Collapse: A 10-Step Recovery Plan by Alan Blinder

(via Thoma)

OK, the Fed has two instruments, IOR and OMO’s, and two targets, the condition of the macroeconomy (which we can proxy with NGDP, though it is actually some mysterious combination of inflation and employment known only to the nonexistent collective consciousness of the Fed) and the health of the banking system. It sets its two instruments so as optimize the expected outcomes for its two targets. But since the instruments interact heavily, it’s somewhat arbitrary to say which instrument is affecting which target. 
The view in this post seems to be that, under a “floor” system, we should regard IOR as the lever that controls the macroeconomy and OMO’s as the lever that controls the banking system. Thus OMO’s are not inflationary: they are a microeconomic tactic that has little to do with macroeconomic outcomes. I have some sympathy for that view, inasmuch as it comports with what is likely to be the Fed’s own perception: when it wants to change macroeconomic conditions, it will change IOR, and when it wants to affect the health of the banking system, it will change its OMO policy. 
But I also find Scott Sumner fairly persuasive on this point. To hold the condition of the banking system constant, the Fed will have to adjust its OMO’s in response to its own changes in IOR. If it reduces IOR, liquidity will flow out of the banking system, and, to avoid making the condition of the system more precarious, the Fed will have to increase the base money stock. If it raises IOR, liquidity will flow into the banking system, and, to avoid paying for more liquidity than it wants, the Fed will have to reduce the base money stock. Holding the intended condition of the banking system constant, a change in IOR is an implicit promise of a change in OMO’s. Holding the intended condition of the banking system constant, the two changes are inseparable, so why should we associate the macroeconomic outcome with the former change rather than the latter? 
In the long run, unless there is a dramatic shift in the Fed’s preference regarding the condition of the banking system, it’s very clear that NGDP will be strongly correlated with the base money stock and very little correlated, if at all, with IOR. In the short run, it’s not clear which correlation will be stronger. (Even in the short run, as Scott points out, base money, at the very least, puts an upper constraint on expected NGDP, because IOR cannot go below zero.) I think there’s a strong case that, given the long run correlation, the presumption in associating an instrument with a target should be that we associate the base money stock with macroeconomic conditions. Hence OMO’s are inflationary, even if the commitment to do those OMO’s is inherent not in the OMO’s themselves but in a prior change in IOR.
If forced to guess, I would go with Jan Hatzius's predictions. 2.5 percent growth second half of 2013 and 3 percent in 2014. The Fed doesn't expect full employment until 2015. Nate Silver talks to him in "The Signal and the Noise."

Bill McBride interviews him here.

9.Will the Federal Reserve stop buying assets? 
No. Admittedly, the minutes of the December 11-12 FOMC meeting suggest that most Fed officials currently expect QE3 to end by late 2013. But we would not make too much of this. For one thing, it is important to remember that the outlook for monetary policy depends on the outlook for the economy.
...
10.Will interest rates rise? 
Not much. ... At the longer end of the curve, we do expect a small increase in 10-year Treasury yields to 2.2% by the end of 2013.

Abbreviations:

IOR is Interest on Reserves

I guess what I don't full understand is this bit where Greg Ip comments on what Krugman wrote:
...I’ve concluded the economics are more complicated and more benign than appreciated, but the political consequences are graver. 
(This is going to get rather abstruse, so bear with me.) Let’s start with the role of coins in the money supply. Long before there was a Federal Reserve, the United States government minted coins, often of silver and gold (specie). Private banks used these coins to back their own, private bank notes. The Fed took over issuance of bank notes in 1913, but coins remain the purview of the Treasury. Since bank notes are a liability of the Fed, they are, like reserves, part of the monetary base, the building block of the broader money supply. Coins, however, are a liability of the Treasury. In fact, in economic terms, coins are analogous to perpetual, zero coupon Treasury bonds. The Treasury can issue coins to the public and use the proceeds to finance the budget, just as if it issued bonds. 
Ordinarily, the Fed buys coins from the Treasury in response to demand from banks and pays for them by printing money which goes into Treasury’s account at the Fed. Sound familiar? It is, in economic terms, exactly the same as quantitative easing, when the Fed buys government bonds and pays for them with newly created money, deposited in banks’ reserve accounts. 
There are some differences, however. While the Fed’s balance sheet expands when it buys a coin, the monetary base- the building block of the money supply – does not. That’s because, coins, unlike bank notes, are an asset to the Fed, not a liability. You can see this by examining the Fed’s balance sheet here. The Fed would pay for the $1 trillion platinum coin by creating an equivalent deposit in the Treasury’s account. Treasury deposits aren’t part of the monetary base, either. As the Treasury spent that money, however, it would shift from the Treasury’s accounts to the reserve accounts of commercial banks. For example, suppose Treasury sends a $1000 refund check to a taxpayer, who deposits it in his account at Citibank. The Fed moves $1,000 from the Treasury’s account to Citibank’s reserve account. The Fed's liabilities remain the same, but the monetary base expands, by as much as $1 trillion, eventually. 
Is that inflationary? Paul Krugman says not now, but maybe later: 
      "Printing money isn’t at all inflationary under current conditions — that is, with the economy depressed and interest rates up against the zero lower bound. But eventually these conditions will end. At that point, to prevent a sharp rise in inflation the Fed will want to pull back much of the monetary base it created in response to the crisis, which means selling off the Federal debt it bought. "
I disagree. The Fed does not have to sell its bonds, or the $1 trillion coin, to control inflation (though it may do so anyway). It only needs to retain control of interest rates, and that does not depend on the size of its balance sheet. 
This, by the way, is at odds with the textbook IS-LM model in which the Fed sets a fixed money supply (represented by the upward sloping LM curve)...
Emphasis added. And:
The Fed influences the level of output by changing its interest rate, i.e. shifting the MP curve up or down. At any given interest rate the money supply is infinitely elastic, which simply means it is determined by demand, rather than the other way around, as monetarists think. I wish undergraduate courses used Mr Romer’s IS-MP model instead of the IS-LM model; students would have a much easier time applying their class work to the real world. 
This essentially explains why no major central bank targets the money supply. The money supply does matter, but for narrow, technical reasons. The Fed controls the short-term interest rates by adjusting the supply of reserve balances between banks. Ordinarily, creating trillions of dollars of reserves through QE (or buying a $1 trillion coin) would overwhelm any conceivable demand by banks for interbank funds, forcing the Fed funds rate down to zero. This would rob the Fed of control of interest rates and thus inflation. In this circumstance, Mr Krugman would be right: the Fed would have to sell vast amounts of bonds and other assets, and the $1 trillion platinum coin, to drain those reserves and regain control of interest rates. 
But in 2008, Congress gave the Fed authority to pay interest on reserves. Because banks should not lend reserves to each other for less than they can get from the Fed, this restores the Fed’s control over interest rates regardless of the size of its balance sheet, and thus over inflation.
Emphasis added. Ip doesn't agree with the Monetarists, like Nick Rowe? Is Ip agreeing with Waldman and Kaminska? Tim Duy's original reply:
Ip argues that interest on reserves gives the Fed the power to control interest rates, and consequently the power to control inflation, regardless of the size of the balance sheet. If you follow Ip's analysis through to its logical conclusion, then why should the Treasury issue debt at all? Why not just issue platinum coins? Could cash and government debt combine to serve the same functions together that they serve separately? Consider the disruptiveness of that outcome to the status quo.

Bottom Line: The platinum coin idea was ultimately doomed to failure because neither the Federal Reserve nor the Treasury could allow for even the remote possibility it might be successful. Its success would not just alter the political dynamic by removing the the debt ceiling as a threat. The success of a platinum coin would fundamentally alter the conventional wisdom about the proper separation of fiscal and monetary policy and the need to control the debt immediately.

At the Turn of the Tide

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0167261/quotes

Gandalf: Gandalf? Yes... that was what they used to call me. Gandalf the Gray. That was my name. 
Gimli: Gandalf... 
Gandalf: *I* am Gandalf the White. And I come back to you now - at the turn of the tide.

The Sound of Republicans on the Debt Ceiling Fight: Run Away! Run Away! by Jonathan Cohn

The Fed Didn't Realize the Housing Bubble Was Driving the Economy by Dean Baker

Fed releases 2007 transcript

via Scott Sumner



Friday, January 18, 2013

The Future's so Bright ... by Bill McBride

Obama is off the chain


From Dec. 19th.

http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/debt-ceiling-strategies/
Transcript from presser earlier today: 
QUESTION: If you don’t get it done, Republicans say they would try to use the debt limit as the next pressure point. Will you negotiate with them in that context? 
OBAMA: No. And, I’ve been very clear about this. 
…the idea that we lurch from crisis to crisis, and every six months, or every nine months that we threaten not to pay our bills on stuff we’ve already bought, and default and ruin the full faith and credit of the United States of America, that’s not how you run a great country. 
So I’ve put forward a very clear principle. I will not negotiate around the debt ceiling. You know, we’re not going to play the same game that we saw happen — saw happen in 2011, which was hugely destructive. It hurt our economy. It provided more uncertainty to the business community than anything else that happened. And, you know, I’m not alone in this. You know, if you go to Wall Street, including talking to a whole bunch of folks who spent a lot of money trying to beat me, they would say it would be disastrous for us to use the debt ceiling as a cudgel to try to win political points on Capitol Hill. 
So we’re not going to do that. And — and — which is why I think that, you know, part of what I hope over the next couple of days we see is a recognition that there is a way to go ahead and get what it is you’ve been fighting for, these guys have been fighting for spending cuts. They can get some very meaningful spending cuts. This would amount to $2 trillion, $2 trillion spending cuts over the last couple of years. 
And in exchange, they’re getting a little over a trillion dollars in revenue. And that meets the pledge that I made during the campaign, which was two to — two dollars and fifty cents of spending cuts for every revenue increase. And that’s an approach that I think most Americans think is appropriate. But I will not negotiate around the debt ceiling. We’re not going to do that again.

--------------------------------------

Greg Sargent:
This also seems to deliberately keep it vague on whether the White House could ultimately support a clean three month extension. And it keeps the drumbeat going that Republicans are continuing to retreat.
Ultimately the game plan here is all about forcing Boehner to show that he can come up with 218 Republican votes for his three month extension, or whether he risks another conservative revolt and a “Plan B” fiasco, in which he ultimately can’t get the votes himself and again reveals his lack of control over the Tea Party caucus.
As I keep saying: The correct position for Democrats is that if Republicans won’t drop the threat of default, it’s their problem. Lather, rinse, repeat. Dems seem to be sticking to this hard line posture.
How long does Boehner last?