Robin Harding in the "Financial Times" "Central Bankers give voice to a Revolution."

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(via DeLong)

The chairman of the US Federal Reserve had reason for cheer and for a little pride: his committee had just said it would keep interest rates close to zero until the US unemployment rate falls below 6.5 per cent (it is 7.7 per cent today). For a central bank, let alone the Fed, to tie rates to the economy in this way was without precedent. 

The move speaks of a quiet revolution that is sweeping over central banks. A day earlier, Mark Carney, currently governor of the Bank of Canada, soon-to-be governor of the Bank of England, became the most senior central banker to praise an even more radical policy: targeting the level of nominal gross domestic product. Instead of having apoplexy, Britain’s chancellor said he wanted a debate. 

Like most revolutions, it seems to come from nowhere but has deep roots. Like most revolutions, it holds the promise of great good but has the potential for harm. It is crucial that politicians and the public understand what this revolution in central bank thinking is and is not about. 

“A revolution is impossible without a revolutionary situation,” said Vladimir Lenin, something of an authority in these matters. (A view from Lenin on recent monetary innovations would be interesting. “The best way to destroy the capitalist system is to debauch the currency” is another of his dainty little remarks.) 

The past five years have led central banks to a revolutionary situation. When the crisis hit, they played their best moves, but to modest effect. Quantitative easing – the ugly term for buying long-term assets in order to drive down long-term interest rates – looks radical thanks to the many-zeroed numbers involved. In reality it is just another way to cut interest rates. 

Monetary policy, and every other kind of policy, failed to engineer a strong recovery in advanced economies. Dissatisfaction with that outcome has led central bankers, spurred on by a healthy dose of external criticism, towards ideas that have been percolating in academia since Japan’s bubble burst in 1990. 

Japan’s long slump drew attention to the vexing problem of what to do if you cut interest rates to zero and the economy remains in the doldrums. Mr Bernanke was vocal in that debate, along with economists such as Paul Krugman, Lars Svensson and Michael Woodford. 

One option is quantitative easing. But there is another option: tell people that you will keep interest rates low in the future. If they believe you then it makes sense for them to borrow now. If rates are to stay low even after the economy recovers then why would they not? 

Central banks are now pursuing that basic insight. The Fed’s new 6.5 per cent unemployment condition is a way to tell everybody that rates will stay low until the economy gets better. The nominal GDP target is a more drastic version of the same thing. In essence it combines growth and inflation into one number. Targeting this not only puts more weight on growth, it means promising to make up for low inflation now with more in the future – another way of saying the central bank will keep interest rates low.