In fact the passage quoted in this post almost makes my head explode.
Bernanke took over the Chair in January 2006. At that point the fed funds rate was 4.25%. The FOMC continued to raise the fed funds rate in quarter point steps until it reached 5.25% in June. By August the yield curve was inverted and remained so through May 2007:
Every recession since WW II has been preceded by an inverted yield curve in the previous 6-18 months. This is something which is easily controlled by setting short term interest rates. At the time Bernanke dismissed it as something that was not important and partially attributable to things outside of the FOMC's control which really is fundamentally BS.
Year on year nominal GDP growth in the US fell from 6.5% in 2006Q1 to 5.3% in 2006Q3 to 4.3% in 2007Q1 to 3.1% in 2008Q1 to 2.7% in 2008Q2:
Lehmans Brothers filed for bankruptcy in 2008Q3. So the rate of change in nominal GDP had been falling significantly and steadily for two years before the financial crisis hit with full force. Financial crises are the inevitable result of steadily and significantly falling rates of growth in nominal incomes.
In my opinion this is at least partially attributable to the change in leadership at the Fed. Greenspan, for all of his many failings, was very sensitive to the state of the economy, and I doubt he would have let monetary policy become so contractionary for so long. Bernanke on the other hand is a great believer in Inflation Targeting (IT) and was paying too much attention to inflation. (One can make an argument that this was a regime change, from flexible "constrained discretion" to a rigid IT.)
This probably became an even greater problem in late 2007 and early 2008 when headline inflation surged due to the boom in commodity prices. The FOMC was aware the economy was in the midst of a financial crisis as early as August 2007 due to the spike in credit spreads, and yet they took their time in lowering the fed funds rate. In fact the "credit and liquidity programs" which started in December 2007 were fully sterilized until the very week Lehmans filed for bankruptcy, effectively borrowing liquidity from the general economy to keep the the more troubled parts of the financial sector above water.
I could go on and on about all the monetary policy mistakes made during Bernanke's first three years but the point is this. Warsh is pinning medals on Bush and Bernanke for how well they handled a crisis which they ultimately were responsible for tipping the economy into.
Brad DeLong has the best piece I’ve seen on Bernanke rage among the hedge funders. His point is that the hedgies keep thinking of the Fed as if it were a rogue trader driving prices away from their natural value, like JP Morgan’s London Whale, rather than as a central bank trying to achieve full employment and target inflation. Hence their rage at the failure of bond prices to collapse the way they “should”.
I’d riff on this a bit further. I suspect that the hedge fund guys are relying a lot on historical correlations that worked pretty well for decades: mean reversion of yields, correlations with deficits, etc., most of it pretty much model-free. The trouble is that a once-in-three-generations deleveraging shock makes such correlations useless. Cross-national analogies — i.e., Japan — would have been better, but don’t seem to have been applied.
What you should be doing is macro analysis, using something like IS-LM — something like what I did here, almost three years ago. (The forecasts have gotten worse since, so the implied long-term rate would be even lower).
But instead of saying that maybe this macro IS-LM stuff has a point, they’re raging against the man with the beard.
Billionaire investor Warren Buffett compared the US Federal Reserve to a hedge fund because of the central bank's ability to profit from bond purchases while accumulating a balance sheet of more than $3 trillion.
"The Fed is the greatest hedge fund in history," Buffett told students yesterday at Georgetown University in Washington.
It's generating "$80 billion or $90 billion a year probably" in revenue for the US government, he said. "And that wasn't the case a few years back."
The central bank has been buying $85 billion of bonds a month to help the US recover as it emerges from the deepest slump since the Great Depression. Chairman Ben S Bernanke and other Federal policy makers unexpectedly opted this week to sustain that pace of asset purchases instead of tapering it, saying they need to see more signs of lasting improvement in the economy.
The Fed remitted $88.4 billion to the US Treasury Department last year. The payments have ballooned as the central bank built its balance sheet during the past five years.
The Fed "is under no pressure, none whatsoever to have to deleverage," Buffett said. "So it can pick its time, and if you have somebody wise there -- and I think Bernanke is wise, and I certainly expect his successor to be -- it can be handled. But it is something that's never quite been done on this scale. It will be interesting to watch."Soros bet against the British hedge fund in the early 90s and won. In the end it helped Great Britain via devaluation.
Last autumn, after months of quiet campaigning, Mr. Bernanke won support for two experiments that made job creation the clear focus of Fed policy. The Fed announced in September that it would buy $40 billion a month in mortgage bonds until the labor market outlook improved “substantially.” In December, it said it would hold short-term rates near zero at least so long as the jobless rate remained above 6.5 percent.
Mr. Bernanke spoke of the Fed’s “grave concern” about unemployment, a problem that he said should concern every American.
But many of the officials who supported the program did so tentatively, and their growing unease drove the decision for Mr. Bernanke to announce in June that the Fed intended to reduce its bond-buying before the end of the year.
This exchange (here, here, and here) between my friend Jared Bernstein and Casey Mulligan is worth a brief comment. As I've told several people who followed it, Mulligan is absolutely presenting the mainstream position in the profession, but Jared is right.The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit by Bernanke
The question, if we ignore silly semantics, is whether the economy typically faces a problem of insufficient demand. In other words, if companies, families, or the government went out spent $500 billion tomorrow would this boost growth or just cause inflation. (Yes, I used all three interchangeably because if the problem is a lack of demand it doesn't matter who spends the money, the short-term effect on the economy is the same.)
Mulligan presents the orthodoxy, periods where lack of demand is a problem are the exception. As a general rule the economy is at or near full employment. In that context the primary result of more spending is higher inflation as we lack the ability to actually produce more goods and services. In this view, the way we get the economy to grow is by increasing supply side factors, like giving workers more incentive to work, training them better, getting more and better capital, and improving technology. By contrast, Jared is making the argument that if workers had higher wages they would be spending more money, which would lead to more output and possibly more investment as well (yes, a supply side effect).
Mulligan acknowledges that we could be in such a situation now, but that this is an exception. This sort of demand shortfall would not generally be an issue. (There was a similar sort of exchange between Paul Krugman and Joe Stiglitz earlier this year with Krugman taking the Mulligan position . [It is the mainstream position.])
In agreeing with Jared and Stiglitz I would like to introduce the widely discussed "savings glut" from the last decade as a major piece of evidence. While many of the people who knowingly talked about this glut may not know it, a savings glut means a shortfall of demand. In a world with a savings glut the problem is that people are not spending enough money to buy up all the goods and services that the economy is capable of producing.
This means that anyone who believed there was a savings glut in the last decade agrees with Jared and Stiglitz, the economy had a serious problem of inadequate aggregate demand. In this world, if workers get higher pay, this translates into more jobs and higher GDP. (We won't call it "growth" in deference to Mulligan.)
There are some other propositions that would follow from the savings glut as well. In this world government deficits are helpful to the economy. They boost demand. That's bad news for the folks who want to say the Bush tax cuts wreck the economy. (No, I have not become a fan of giving money to rich people, but no one pays me to shill for the Democrats.)
The basic economic problem becomes how to find ways to either increase demand on a sustained basis or adjust to a situation in which we will maintain a lower level of output without hurting people with inadequate incomes. (Can anyone say reduced workweeks and longer vacations?)
Anyhow, this is about the most fundamental point that we can have in economics. It is amazing how much confusion exists on the topic.
Also, there’s a danger in the Stiglitzian approach, namely that people might conclude that fixing the short-run shortfall in demand must wait until we fix the long-run problem of inequality, which is going to be very hard and a long time coming. We need stimulus, or at least an end to austerity, now, even if restoring a middle-class society isn’t going to happen any time soon.
The Fed chairman conceded that “one cannot look back at the Great Moderation today without asking whether the sustained economic stability of the period somehow promoted the excessive risk-taking that followed. The idea that this long period of calm lulled investors, financial firms and financial regulators into paying insufficient attention to building risks must have some truth in it.”
One economist who would have expected that development was Hyman Minsky. In 1995, the year before Minsky died, Steve Keen, an Australian economist, used his ideas to set forth a possibility that now seems prescient. It was published in The Journal of Post Keynesian Economics.
He suggested that lending standards would be gradually reduced, and asset prices would rise, as confidence grew that “the future is assured, and therefore that most investments will succeed.” Eventually, the income-earning ability of an asset would seem less important than the expected capital gains. Buyers would pay high prices and finance their purchases with ever-rising amounts of debt.
When something went wrong, an immediate need for liquidity would cause financiers to try to sell assets immediately. “The asset market becomes flooded,” Mr. Keen wrote, “and the euphoria becomes a panic, the boom becomes a slump.” Minsky argued that could end without disaster, if inflation bailed everyone out. But if it happened in a period of low inflation, it could feed upon itself and lead to depression.
“The chaotic dynamics explored in this paper,” Mr. Keen concluded, “should warn us against accepting a period of relative tranquillity in a capitalist economy as anything other than a lull before the storm.”
When I talked to Mr. Keen this week, he called my attention to the fact that Mr. Bernanke, in his 2000 book “Essays on the Great Depression,” briefly mentioned, and dismissed, both Minsky and Charles Kindleberger, author of the classic “Manias, Panics and Crashes.”
They had, Mr. Bernanke wrote, “argued for the inherent instability of the financial system but in doing so have had to depart from the assumption of rational economic behavior.” In a footnote, he added, “I do not deny the possible importance of irrationality in economic life; however it seems that the best research strategy is to push the rationality postulate as far as it will go.”
It seems to me that he had both Minsky and Kindleberger wrong. Their insight was that behavior that seems perfectly rational at the time can turn out to be destructive. As Robert J. Barbera, now the co-director of the Center for Financial Economics at Johns Hopkins University, wrote in his 2009 book, “The Cost of Capitalism,” “One of Minsky’s great insights was his anticipation of the ‘Paradox of Goldilocks.’ Because rising conviction about a benign future, in turn, evokes rising commitment to risk, the system becomes increasingly vulnerable to retrenchment, notwithstanding the fact that consensus expectations remain reasonable relative to recent history.”
The Federal Reserve’s chairman, Ben S. Bernanke, emphasized on Wednesday that the central bank remains committed to bolstering the economy, insisting that any deceleration in the Fed’s stimulus campaign will happen because it is achieving its goals, not because it has lowered its sights.
Mr. Bernanke said he still expected to reach that point in the coming months but, in what may have been his final appearance before the House Financial Services Committee, he cautioned that Congress itself posed the greatest risk to growth.
“The risks remain that tight federal fiscal policy will restrain economic growth over the next few quarters by more than we currently expect, or that the debate concerning other fiscal policy issues, such as the status of the debt ceiling, will evolve in a way that could hamper the recovery,” he told the committee....
Analysts said that the strongest new signal Mr. Bernanke delivered in recent weeks concerned the sluggish pace of inflation. Prices rose just 1 percent during the 12 months ending in May, well below the 2 percent pace that the Fed considers healthy. Fed officials insisted for much of the year that inflation would rebound from the lowest pace on record.In recent weeks, the Fed has emphasized that it will take action if inflation does not. On Wednesday, Mr. Bernanke put inflation alongside unemployment as the justification for the Fed’s continuing efforts.
“Our intention is to keep monetary policy highly accommodative for the foreseeable future, and the reason that’s necessary is because inflation is below our target and unemployment is still quite high,” Mr. Bernanke told the committee.
Michael Feroli, chief United States economist at JPMorgan Chase, noted that Mr. Bernanke also cited the risk of deflation, something he had not done for several years. “The mention of deflation risks, rather than just low inflation, is a fairly strong statement coming from a sitting central bank chief,” Mr. Feroli wrote.
Mr. Bernanke also emphasized that the Fed would not be satisfied with a decline in the unemployment rate if it was driven by people giving up the search for work rather than people finding new jobs. Importantly, he described this as a reason the Fed might extend its policy of low interest rates but not asset purchases.
The “lower for longer” message on rates, which has been so carefully crafted by the FOMC’s forward guidance, seems to have been thrown overboard by the bond market with remarkable alacrity as soon as the Fed has indicated that it may slow the pace of policy easing. The reason for this is that past history is replete with episodes in which the Fed has tightened policy very rapidly once its enthusiasm for easing has started to wane.The 1994 example, when the Fed failed to guide the markets about the likely pace of tightening, is of course part of the folklore of the bond market. Less well remembered is the example of 2003, when the first signal that the Fed was slowing the pace of easing was followed by a 100 basis point rise in bond yields within a few months, even though the Fed’s forward guidance about tightening at a moderate pace was increasingly explicit.The problem is that, once the market starts to believe that the Fed is “done”, it will inevitably start to build into the yield curve a rising probability that the FOMC will embark on a normal path of tightening before too long. In order to mitigate this, Mr Bernanke is likely this week to remind the markets that the intention to slow asset purchases “in the next few meetings” is contingent on events in the labour market, is not the start of policy tightening, and is completely distinct from any intention to start raising rates.The Fed has of course said that it will keep short rates at near zero until the unemployment rate has fallen to 6.5 per cent, subject to projected inflation remaining under 2.5 per cent. One way of forcing home the message that this will not happen soon would be to reduce the unemployment threshold to 6.0 per cent. This would be in line with the Fed’s fundamental view of labour market behaviour, as previously argued here.If the chairman wishes to regain control of the market’s path for forward short rates, he may need to reduce the unemployment threshold to 6 per cent before too long. But I do not expect him to go that far this week.
When it does announce tapering, the Fed will try to reiterate that the rise in short-term rates will still not come until much later. But just as QE3 added emphasis to the declaration of a commitment to an extended period of low interest rates on the way down, ending QE3 will tend to detract from that message as we start to look at the path back up.And just as a weak economy was the primary reason the Fed embarked on QE3, a strengthening economy will be the primary reason the Fed ends it. And if the economy is strengthening, interest rates will be headed up, regardless of whether the Fed keeps buying bonds or not. It's worth emphasizing that the recent rise in interest rates has been a global phenomenon, not just something seen in the United States.
Interest rates on 10-year government bonds, weekly, June 1, 2012 to June 13, 2013 for the US, Canada, and the UK.
If you want to claim that the recent rise in rates is just an anticipation of what the Fed is going to do, the story has to be that the U.S. Federal Reserve is causing the whole world to move.The alternative view is that it's a big world out there that will ultimately force the Federal Reserve to move.
Federal fiscal policy, taking into account both discretionary actions and so-called automatic stabilizers, was, on net, quite expansionary during the recession and early in the recovery. However, a substantial part of this impetus was offset by spending cuts and tax increases by state and local governments, most of which are subject to balanced-budget requirements, and by subsequent fiscal tightening at the federal level. Notably, over the past four years, state and local governments have cut civilian government employment by roughly 700,000 jobs, and total government employment has fallen by more than 800,000 jobs over the same period. For comparison, over the four years following the trough of the 2001 recession, total government employment rose by more than 500,000 jobs.Bernanke's statement The Economic Outlook given before the Joint Economic Committee
From my perspective, of course, the hedge fundies' analogy between the London Whale and the Washington Super-Whale is all wrong--the hedge fundies are thinking partial-equilibrium when they should be thinking general equilibrium. CDX IG 9 has a well-defined fundamental value: the payouts should each of the 125 companies go bankrupt times the chance that they will. What Bruno Iksil does does not affect that fundamental value. He can bet, and drive the price, but he cannot change the fundamental.But the Washington Super-Whale is different.In a healthy economy, the Ten-Year Treasury Bond does have a well-defined fundamental. When the economy is healthy enough that pricing power reverts to workers and keeping inflation from rising is job #1 for the Federal Reserve, the level of the Federal Funds rate now and in the future is pinned down by the requirement to hit the inflation target. And the fundamental of the Ten-Year Treasury Bond is then the expected value over the bond's lifetime of the future Federal Funds rate plus the appropriate ex ante duration risk premium.But when the economy is depressed, like now? When market appetite for short-term cash at a zero interest rate is unlimited, like now? When workers have no pricing power, and so wage inflation is subdued, like now? The Federal Reserve is not J.P. Morgan Chase. It is not a highly-leveraged financial institution that must worry about holding too much duration risk. As Glenn Rudebusch once said: "Our business model here at the Fed is simple: (i) print reserve deposits that cost us 0 (OK. 0.25%/yer), (2) invest them in interest-paying bonds that we then hold to maturity, (3) PROFIT!!" And the more quantitative easing the Fed undertakes and the larger is its balance sheet the larger is the amount of money the Federal Reserve makes on its portfolio, without running any risks--as long as the economy remains depressed.The Federal Reserve, you see, is unlike J.P. Morgan Chase: the Federal Reserve does print money.
I’d riff on this a bit further. I suspect that the hedge fund guys are relying a lot on historical correlations that worked pretty well for decades: mean reversion of yields, correlations with deficits, etc., most of it pretty much model-free. The trouble is that a once-in-three-generations deleveraging shock makes such correlations useless. Cross-national analogies — i.e., Japan — would have been better, but don’t seem to have been applied.
What you should be doing is macro analysis, using something like IS-LM — something like what I did here, almost three years ago. (The forecasts have gotten worse since, so the implied long-term rate would be even lower).
But instead of saying that maybe this macro IS-LM stuff has a point, they’re raging against the man with the beard.
The implication for policy [from Dudley's speech]:
Currently we are falling well short of our employment objective and the restrictive stance of federal fiscal policy is a factor. On inflation, we are also falling short, but by a considerably smaller margin. As a consequence, we need to keep monetary policy very accommodative.
I do not claim that there are no costs or risks associated with our unconventional monetary policy regime. But I see greater cost and risk in moving prematurely to a policy setting that might not prove sufficiently accommodative to ensure a sustainable, strengthening recovery...
Seems to be a clear indication that he is not inclined to alter the pace of asset purchases in the near future. At a minimum, Dudley is looking for evidence that the recent acceleration in job growth is sustainable (in concert with improvement across a broad range of indicators), and I think that will come only after another six months of nfp numbers consistently 200k+.(emphasis added.)
The uncoordinated abandonment of the gold standard in the early 1930s gave rise to the idea of "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies. According to this analysis, as put forth by important contemporary economists like Joan Robinson, exchange rate depreciations helped the economy whose currency had weakened by making the country more competitive internationally.5 Indeed, the decline in the value of the pound after 1931 was associated with a relatively early recovery from the Depression by the United Kingdom, in part because of some rebound in exports. However, according to this view, the gains to the depreciating country were equaled or exceeded by the losses to its trading partners, which became less internationally competitive--hence, "beggar thy neighbor." Over time, so-called competitive depreciations became associated in the minds of historians with the tariff wars that followed the passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff in the United States. Both types of policies were decried--and in some textbooks, still are--as having prolonged the Depression by disrupting trade patterns while leading to an ultimately fruitless and destructive battle over shrinking international markets.(my hyperlink emphasis. "At least two students who studied under her have won the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences: Amartya Sen and Joseph Stiglitz. In his autobiographical notes for the Nobel Foundation, Stiglitz described their relationship as "tumultuous" and Robinson as unused to "the kind of questioning stance of a brash American student"; after a term, Stiglitz therefore "switched to Frank Hahn".[2] In his own autobiography notes, Sen described Robinson as "totally brilliant but vigorously intolerant".[3]")
Economists still agree that Smoot-Hawley and the ensuing tariff wars were highly counterproductive and contributed to the depth and length of the global Depression. However, modern research on the Depression, beginning with the seminal 1985 paper by Barry Eichengreen and Jeffrey Sachs, has changed our view of the effects of the abandonment of the gold standard.6 Although it is true that leaving the gold standard and the resulting currency depreciation conferred a temporary competitive advantage in some cases, modern research shows that the primary benefit of leaving gold was that it freed countries to use appropriately expansionary monetary policies. By 1935 or 1936, when essentially all major countries had left the gold standard and exchange rates were market-determined, the net trade effects of the changes in currency values were certainly small. Yet the global economy as a whole was much stronger than it had been in 1931. The reason was that, in shedding the strait jacket of the gold standard, each country became free to use monetary policy in a way that was more commensurate with achieving full employment at home. Moreover, and critically, countries also benefited from stronger growth in trading partners that purchased their exports. In sharp contrast to the tariff wars, monetary reflation in the 1930s was a positive-sum exercise, whose benefits came mainly from higher domestic demand in all countries, not from trade diversion arising from changes in exchange rates.
But what I found striking was Hiatt’s offhand explanation of why his never-changing, never-right prediction keeps not happening; it’s because
the Federal Reserve is gobbling up U.S. debt to keep interest rates lowClearly, this has become part of the CW. And once again we see how a highly dubious economic idea can become part of what Everyone knows and Nobody disagrees with, even if in this case Nobody includes a fellow by the name of Ben Bernanke, who gave a speech on this very topic just a few weeks ago.
In fact, the notion that rates are low just because the Fed is buying up debt is wrong on at least three levels.
First, as Bernanke stressed, long-term interest rates have moved very similarly across a wide range of countries, including countries where the central bank is buying up lots of bonds and countries where it isn’t. Here, for example, is a comparison of the US and France:
THE Federal Open Market Committee concluded its two-day meeting today with a nothing-burger of a statement. Very little changed in its wording on the state of the economy, and both asset purchases and interest-rate guidance remain as they were before. Things continue on as they have. New economic projections released with the statement suggest the Fed expects a bit less output growth and a bit less inflation than it previously did over the next few years, with the unemployment rate moving toward its long run range (between 5.2% and 6.0%) a little bit faster. Nothing to see here.
That's a problem. It's easy to lose perspective on the state of the labour market, given that our expectations slowly adjust over time and that relative to other large economies America doesn't look so bad. But the recovery is nearly four years old, and the unemployment rate remains well above the pre-recession level. And the Fed doesn't anticipate unemployment returning to its natural level until 2015 at the earliest. It should go without saying that seven full years with unemployment above normal is a sign of a pretty lousy monetary-policy performance.
A good part of the explanation for that miserable showing can be summed up in three words: zero lower bound (ZLB). Since December of 2008, when the Fed cut the fed funds rate target to roughly zero, the FOMC has been scrapping to try and boost recovery without its favoured tool. It has had some success. But the recovery has obviously been much, much weaker than anyone would have preferred. And one can conclude, from this performance and from Fed statements, that the weak recovery is rooted in the fact that the Fed is less convinced of the benefits of the unconventional tools it has been deploying and more concerned about their risks, relative to normal interest-rate policy.
Surely, then, the Fed is looking ahead and trying to make sure that in the future it doesn't have to use unconventional tools. Right? Not exactly. If recovery proceeds as the Fed anticipates, its interest-rate target will remain at near zero until at least 2015. Perhaps more worrying, the FOMC's best guess at the appropriate, long-run value of the fed funds rate is about 4%. That is strikingly low. In each of the past three recessions the Fed has responded by cutting the fed funds rate more than 4 percentage points. A fed funds rate at that level virtually guarantees that the next downturn will result in a relapse into ZLB territory. Unless the Fed suddenly becomes much more comfortable with unconventional policy, the unemployment rate will rise more than it otherwise would and recovery will be weaker as a result. And that's assuming that growth over the next few years actually is robust enough to allow the Fed to get rates back to 4%, which is not at all guaranteed.
At today's post-meeting press conference, I attempted to ask Ben Bernanke whether the FOMC was concerned about the lack of a cushion between the fed funds rate and the ZLB and whether the FOMC had considered adjusting policy to address the issue—by raising the long-run inflation target, for instance. His answer, essentially, was that the Fed had only just announced its 2% inflation target and had no plans to change it. And he reckoned that weighing the costs and benefits of ZLB events with an eye toward computing the optimal inflation target was a matter for academic debate. Some research suggests that at low inflation rates an economy will hit the ZLB more often than was previously assumed, he noted, which might make the cost-benefit trade-off of a higher target more attractive.
Fair enough; monetary economists have and will continue to debate these points. But the issue is not merely academic. Most of the other questions at the press conference concerned the problem of continued high unemployment and the Fed's assessment of the risks of unconventional policy. We are living the consequences of the ZLB and the Fed's best estimates have America right back in the same hole when the next recession hits. If the Fed is simply waiting for academia to sort things out, that's really disconcerting. Alternatively, if the Fed is actually pretty comfortable using unconventional policy and not particularly worried about rolling it out again during the next downturn then one has to ask why it isn't doing much more now to address unemployment.
The answer doesn't have to be a higher inflation target. It can be a commitment to treat the current target more symmetrically (that is, to err above as often as it errs below). Or it could be a switch to an NGDP level target. But right now, the Fed's answer seems to be: get used to nasty recessions and insufficient monetary responses, suckers. At least until academics tell us its safe to try something new.
